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I. INTRODUCTION 
When a corporation fails to pay withholding taxes, section 6672 
of the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") imposes personalliabil-
ity on those corporate employers and officers deemed "responsi-
ble" and "willful" for the deficiency.2 This provision is triggered 
1 Werner v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 558, 563 (D. Conn. 1974). 
• I.R.C. § 6672(a). Section 6672(a) states, in pertinent part: 
Id. 
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed 
by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner 
to evade or truthfully account for and pay over such tax, or defeat any such tax or the 
payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a 
penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not ac-
counted for and paid over. 
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when the employer who is directly liable fails to pay.3 The Internal 
R:evenue Service (the "Service") places taxes collected pursuant to 
section 6672 in "a special fund in trust for the United States."· 
Since the funds are held in trust, they may not be used by the 
corporation as working capital. lI In essence, section 6672 provides 
an altern,ate source to which the government can turn if the em-
ployer fails to collect or misdirects the funds,S and it is an impor-
• Several provisions of the Internal Revenue Code require third persons to collect taxes 
from the taxpayer. See I.R.C. §§ 3102(a) and 3402(a) which respectively require deduction 
from wages paid to employees of the employer's share of FICA taxes and the withholding 
tax on wages applicable to individual income taxes. 
• I.R.C. § 7501(a). Section 7501(a) states, in pertinent part: 
(a) General rule. Whenever any person is required to collect or withhold any internal 
revenue tax from any other person and to pay over such tax to the United States, the 
amount of the tax so collected or withheld shall be held to be a special fund in trust 
for the United States. The amount of such fund shall be assessed, collected, and paid 
in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and limitations (including 
penalties) as are applicable with respect to the taxes from which such fund arose. 
Id. Trust fund taxes accrue from the date the taxes are withheld from the employees' 
paychecks until the date the employer is required to pay the taxes to the government. 
Under current Code requirements, payment is made quarterly. Once net wages are paid to 
the employee, the. taxes withheld are credited to the employee regardless of whether they 
are paid by the employer. Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238 (1978). 
• Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238 (1978); Donelan Phelps & Co. v. United States, 
876 F.2d 1373, 1375 (8th Cir. 1989); Gustin v. United States, 876 F.2d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 
1989); Collins v. United States, 848 F.2d 740, 741 (6th Cir. 1988); Gephart v. United States, 
818 F.2d 469, 472 (6th Cir. 1987); McGlothin v. United States, 720 F.2d 6, 8 (6th Cir. 1983). 
6 I.R.C. § 7501 does not require a corporation to segregate the withheld taxes from its 
general fund. Newsome v. United States, 431 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1970). Funds must be segre-
gated in a separate bank account only when specifically requested by the government. See 
I.R.C. § 7512. Section 7512 states in pertinent part: 
(a) General Rule. - Whenever any person who is required to collect, account for, and 
pay over any tax imposed by subtitle C, or chapter 33-
(1) at the time and in the manner prescribed by law or regulations 
(A) fails to collect, truthfully account for, or pay over such tax, or 
(B) fails to make deposits, payments, or returns of such tax, and 
(2)is notified, by notice delivered in hand to such person, of any such failure, then 
all the requirements of subsection (b) shall be complied with. In the case of a corpo-
ration, partnership, or trust, notice delivered in hand to an officer, partner, or trustee, 
shall, for purposes of this section, be deemed to be notice delivered in hand to such 
corporation, partnership, or trust and to all officers, partners, trustees, and employees 
thereof. 
(b) Requirements. Any person who is required to collect, account for, and pay over 
any tax imposed by subtitle C or Chapter 33, if notice has been delivered to such 
person in accordance with subsection (a), shall collect the taxes imposed by subtitle C 
or chapter 33 which becomes collectible after delivery of such notice, shall (not later 
than the end of the second banking day after any amount of such taxes is collected) 
deposit such amount in a separate account in a bank (as defined in section 581), and 
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tant protection of the tax collection process. 
The Service is responsible for enforcing section 6672. If a corpo-
ration fails to pay the taxes due by an employee, the Service incurs 
an immediate pecuniary loss because the employee is given full 
credit for taxes that were to be withheld by the employer. To pro-
tect against such loss, the Service institutes the tax collection pro-
cess against the corporation. If the corporation is insolvent, as is 
often the case, the Service will assert the "third party" device and 
actively pursue the officers and directors7 for the deficiency. As in 
the case of deficiency assessments,8 the Service can seize assets and 
encumber property before a determination has been made as to 
who the "responsible person" is. 
Once a person is assessed, attempts to stay collection have 
proven largely unsuccessful. 9 Securing a stay requires a bond.10 
However, this protection is illusory in two respects. First, the alleg-
edly responsible taxpayer has almost always exhausted his liquid 
assets to defend the action. Second, the value of the bond must 
cover the assessment, an amount frequently disproportionate to 
shall keep the amount of such taxes in such account until payment over to the United 
States. Any such account shall be designated as a special fund in trust for the United 
States, payable to the United States by such person as trustee. 
Id. The absence of a segregation requirement creates a unique problem for § 6672 cases. 
When a trust exists, f~nds are usually segregated and the trustee has a fiduciary obligation 
to ensure that they are preserved for the beneficiary. In § 6672 cases, employers typically 
commingle all funds, making it difficult to identify the res of the trust. Since the funds 
accumulate in a single account, they are a tempting source of cash to a floundering corpora-
tion. See Slodov, 436 U.S. at 238. 
7 This administrative practice has translated into a presumption as a matter of law. Con-
sequently, the taxpayer carries the burden of proof. See United States v. Lease, 346 F.2d 
696 (2nd Cir. 1965). See also infra § II(D)(2) for a more complete explanation of this 
presumption. 
8 Section 6861 permits the Service to depart from its standard system of assessment and 
collection in exigent circumstances, i.e. when collection will be jeopardized by delay. Pre-
assessment judicial review is not required. 
• Charles E. Falk, Trust Fund Tax Liability: A Kinder and Gentler I.R.S.?, 34 Tax Mgmt. 
117 (1993). 
10 26 U.S.C. § 6672 provides in part: 
(b) Extension of period of collection where bond is flied. 
(1)ln general, if, within 30 days after the day on which notice and demand of any 
penalty under subsection (a) is made against any person, such person -
(A) pays an amount which is less than the minimum amount required to commence 
a proceeding in court with respect to his liability for such penalty, 
(B)flies a claim for refund of the amount so paid, and 
(C)furnishes a bond which meets the requirements of paragraph (3). 
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the accumulated assets of many taxpayers. 
Unlike tax deficiency claims, persons assessed under section 
6672 must apply for a refund either in federal district court or in 
the Court of Federal Claims.ll To defeat the assessment, taxpayers 
have asserted constitutional violations,12 non-willful depletion of 
funds by predecessors,13 reliance on third parties, U reliance on Ser-
vice agents/Ii delegation of authority/6 lack of fiscal control,I' and 
11 The federal district courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Federal 
Claims (formerly the Claims Court) to hear § 6672 cases. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(1), 1491. 
Appeals from either court are taken to the federal court of appeals or the federal circuit 
court of appeals respectively. Taxpayers in § 6672 cases cll1lnot challenge the validity of the 
penalty in United States Tax Court because a deficiency notice, a condition precedent to 
. jurisdiction, is not present. Boynton v. United States, 566 F.2d 50, 53 (9th Cir. 1977). 
Assessed taxpayers must pay the divisible amount of a penalty assessment attributable to 
a single individual's withholding before instituting a refund action. I.R.C. §§ 6672, 1346. As 
a matter of strategy, taxpayers may be attracted to the Court of Federal Claims because it 
has produced more favorable precedent than the federal district courts. See Stewart v. 
United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 1 (1989); Heimark v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 643 (1989); Fiest v. 
United States, 607 F.2d 954 (Cl. Ct. 1979). See also Schultz v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 280, 
(1990) where the Claims Court was willing to examine the personal fault component of 
willfulness. 
If the case is brought in federal district court, it is usually tried to a jury. However, at 
least two circuits have held there is no right to a jury trial in a § 6672 case if fraudulent 
conveyances are also involved. United States v. McMahan, 556 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1977); 
Gefen v. United States, 400 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1968)(following Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 
46 (2nd Cir. 1961» . 
.. Cooper v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 117 (E.D.Va. 1982) (finding that plaintiff did not 
present evidence that the Service had departed from its administrative practice and. singled 
plaintiff out for harsher treatment than that accorded other taxpayers); Cohn v. United 
States, 399 F. Supp. 168, 171 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (noting that "[A] legislative classification 
must be sustained unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a 
legitimate governmental interest") (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 
(1973». Since the government has a compelling interest in the prompt collection of its law-
ful revenue, the classification [taxpayers who are assessed deficiencies in income, estate and 
gift taxes are permitted to contest liability prior to payment] is justified. Id . 
• 3 This defense is valid if the fund balance falls below the amount of taxes withheld. 
Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238 (1978) . 
.. Newsome v. United States, 431 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1970) (by relying on third party 
information, "mere reasonable expectation of sufficient funds at a later date is not a defense 
to a charge of willful failure to comply with the commands of section 6672"). 
'0 North v. United States, 951 F.2d 1259 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1675 
(1992) (finding that allegations of affirmative misconduct by officials were insufficient to 
prevent application of penalties, specifically where the Service entered into an agreement to 
'permit continuation of a delinquent company and failed to exercise its rights in valid, judi-
cially perfected security interests) . 
• 8 Mazo v. United States, 591 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979) 
(providing that the mere delegation of responsibility to another will not shield the otherwise 
responsible person from liability; delegation is effective if it is comprehensive as to power 
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failure of the Service to collect taxes from the employer.18 Despite 
these arguments, courts have uniformly upheld the application of 
section 6672/9 prompting several commentators to conclude that 
and authority over corporate affairs and the ultimate control over corporate management is 
placed completely in another officer.). See also Daugherty v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 335, 
346 (1989). As currently applied, the delegation theory is contrary to the earlier lines of 
cases. See Campbell v. Nixon, 207 F. Supp. 826, 829 (E.D. Mich. 1962); Wiggins v. United 
States, 188 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Tenn. 1960). 
17 Bauer v. United States, 543 F.2d 142, 148·49 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (finding that taxpayer was 
"at best" only a nominal figure of authority in the fiscal area). I. Spivak v. United States, 370 F.2d 612 (2nd Cir. 1967) (finding that the government's 
election to pursue responsible persons rather that the assets of an insolvent corporation was 
an appropriate exercise of administrative discretion). See also United States v. Amon, 669 
F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1981) (providing that selective prosecution is permitted in both crimi· 
nal and civil contexts without raising the specter of "government misconduct"); Van Wes· 
terhuyzen v. U. S. Treasury Department, 407 F. Supp. 334 (D. Minn. 1975): Kelly v. Leth· 
ert, 362 F.2d 629 (8th Cir. 1966). 
,. In examining the application of the statute, courts have focused on whether the 
targeted persons are responsible for collecting and paying over trust fund taxes and have 
willfully failed to remit such taxes to the Service. Of the approximately 270 federal and 
clainls court cases decided since the Code's 1954 codification, taxpayers have prevailed in 
only twenty·three, mostly on technical grounds. 
SUPREME COURT: Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238 (1978) (willfulness prong of 
§ 6672 is not intended to impose liability without personal fault). 
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEAL: Elmore v. United States, 842 F.2d 1128 (8th Cir. 
1988) (trial court erred in omitting a Slodov instruction, specifically, the timing of assump· 
tion of control); Nolan v. United States, 829 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1987) (taxpayer's judgment 
was reversed and remanded because the jury instructions omitted reference to "deliberate" 
choice, a critical component of willfulness); Barrett v. United States, 580 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 
1978) (taxpayer, who was dominated by her husband, did not have ultimate authority over 
expenditure of funds): Haffa v. United States, 516 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1975) (taxpayer lacked 
control over disposition of funds); Adams v. United States, 504 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1974) (case 
remanded to determine if taxpayer exercised substantial control over company's finances); 
Dudley v. United States, 428 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1970) (taxpayer ceased being a responsible 
person before he had knowledge that the check to the Service was dishonored); United 
States v. Graham, 309 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962) (case remanded to determine if board con· 
trolled payment of taxes or whether power was delegated to corporate officer). 
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: Graunke v. United States, 711 F. Supp. 388 (N.D. Ill. 
1989) (taxpayer's authority was limited to accounting and bill paying at sole shareholder's 
order); Mattingly v. United States, 711 F. Supp. 1535 (D. Nev. 1989) (taxpayer's duties were 
confined to signing prepared checks at request of company president); Abramson v. United 
States, 55 A.F.T.R.2d (P·H) 1479 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (taxpayer's limited check writing author· 
ity cannot be deemed to be discretion over which creditors to pay fust): Geiger v. United 
States, 583 F. Supp. 1166 (D. Ariz. 1984) (although taxpayer had check writing authority, he 
lacked final word over monetary matters); Fort v. United States, 48 A.F.T.R.2d (P·H) 1427 
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (taxpayer was not a responsible person: his check writing authority was a 
clerical duty); Howard v. United States, 38 A.F.T.R.2d (P·H) 6228 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (tax· 
payer was found not to be a responsible person): United States v. Stanton, 37 A.F.T.R.2d 
(P·H) 5744 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (taxpayer lacked responsibility for collection and payment of 
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the statute's reach is excessive and that its current application un-
dermines, if not eviscerates, statutory intent. One such commenta-
tor noted: "Application of section 6672, as currently interpreted, 
often impose[s] a harsh penalty on morally innocent and unsus-
pecting business managers. "20 Another argued: "It is certainly not 
fair to saddle an individual corporate employee who is not respon-
sible for the problem with a staggering corporate debt just to pro-
vide an alternate means of collection."2l In reality, section 6672 is 
intended to be a powerful deterrent against the promiscuous or de-
liberate use of money which rightfully belongs to the government. 
It is only when courts construe the statute mechanically, without 
regar9 to the actual control possessed by the "responsible person," 
that section 6672 begins to reveal its most pernicious side.22 
Part I of this article provides a framework for understanding the 
evolution of section 6672 by examining its historical underpin-
nings. Part II discusses the "responsible" component of section 
6672, the judicially-created formulae for imposing penalties, and 
the justification for a bright-line test. Part III addresses the "will-
taxes because he had no control over business finances); Fried v. United States, 68-1 U.S. 
Tax Cas. (CCH) 1) 9372 (S.D. Fla. 1968) (taxpayer was not willful as he was prevented from 
making payment by co-signer's refusal to sign check); Petrie v. United States, 62-2 U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH) 1) 9600 (N.D. Ga. 1962) (jury found taxpayer not responsible after "bad pur-
pose" was stricken from "willful" definition); Campbell v. Nixon, 207 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. 
Mich. 1962) (taxpayer lacked authority to direct payment of tax obligations); Bellah v. Pat-
terson, 197 F. Supp. 522 (N.D. Ala. 1961) (since taxpayer was not involved in financial as-
pects of company, she was not willful). 
CLAIMS COURToCOURT OF CLAIMS: Heimark v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 15 (1989) 
(taxpayer lacked the status, duty and authority to make him a responsible person); Stewart . 
v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 1 (1989) (taxpayer lacked final word over which creditors would 
be paid although he was an officer and an owner of the corporation); Feist v. United States, 
607 F.2d 954 (Cl. Ct. 1979) (taxpayer was not willful because he acted in good faith by 
relying on successor entity's representation to satisfy the delinquency); McCarty v. United 
States, 437 F.2d 961 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (United States Navy, not taxpayer, was obligated to carry 
out taxpayer company's agreement with Service after it took over the company) . 
•• Stephen J. Vasek, The Hidden Tax Trap of I.R.C. Section 6672, 67 Ky. L.J. 27, 73 
(1978). 
11 James E. Hungerford, Howard v. United States: Who Should Be Responsible for the 
100 Percent Penalty?, 12 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 451, 470 (1989) . 
• 1 The harsh effect of the statute was best captured by the Seventh Circuit: U[T]he stat-
ute is harsh, but the danger against which it is directed - that of failing to pay over money 
withheld from employees until it is too late, because the company has gone broke - is an 
acute one against which, perhaps, only harsh measures are availing." Wright v. United 
States, 809 F.2d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 1987). That this "remedial" statute is so endowed, com-
bined with the magnitude of the corporate debt, makes the court's standard of review abso-
lutely crucial to a just result. 
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fulness" requirement of section 6672· and its dilution in recent 
court interpretations. Finally, part IV assesses the impact of sec-
tion . 6672 legislation and the implications of retaining a collection 
system which penalizes unsuspecting corporate employees and es-
sentially rubber-stamps the assessments of the Service. In the ab-
sence of major legislative reform, the author invites a return to a 
higher standard of willfulness akin to the pre-1959 applications 
which required an intent and capacity to defraud the government. 
This standard would balance government and individual interests 
while leaving intact the section's primary objective: to impose per-
sonalliability only on those persons responsible for deliberately di-
verting or dissipating "trust fund" taxes. 
II. STATUTORY HISTORY 
A. Early Revenue Acts 
In the early 1800s, internal revenue represented only a fraction 
of total government revenue. Until the Civil War this revenue was 
matched by customs duties. Congress expanded the tax system in 
1861, and, in order to collect money to accommodate the wartime 
effort, a special income tax was levied.23 Penalty provisions in-
cluded incarceration of taxpayers and property levies.24 Intentional 
acts, distinguished from acts of neglect, were punishable by more 
severe penalties.26 
In 1894, Congress passed a second income tax which was soon 
. declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.26 Nineteen years 
later, Congress enacted the Sixteenth Amendment which author-
ized Congress to lay and collect taxes from various sources and 
which became the foqntainhead for section 6672 and all precursor 
provisions . 
•• Bernard Grossfeld and James D. Bryle, A Brief Comparative History of the Origins of 
the Income Tax in Great Britain, Germany and the United States, 2 J. of T. P. 211, 237-40 
(1983) . 
.. Gerald P. Moran, Willfulness: The Inner Sanctum or Unnecessary Element of Section 
6672, 11 Tol. L. 
Rev. 709, 726 (1980) . 
•• Id. at 727 . 
• e Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
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B. Revenue Act of 1918 
The antecedent provision of section 6672 was the Revenue Act of 
1918.27 Section 1308 of this act established a three-tiered scale of 
penalties for failure to comply with the federal excise tax provi-
sions.28 The third provision imposed an added criminal sanction 
equal to 100% of the evaded tax "if the offender willfully refused 
to comply with the general excise tax provisions."29 Professor Mo-
ran has suggested that by employing the term willful, "Congress 
intended to impose a criminal sanction only where there existed an 
intentional and high degree of fault closely resembling, if not iden-
tical to, an interest to defraud the government of its taxes. "30 
Six years later, Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1924.31 The 
Act's substantive changes confirmed the relationship between the 
use of "willful" in criminal tax provisions and the antecedent pro-
visions of the Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921.32 In addition to im-
posing a 100% penalty, the act provided: 
Any person required under this Act to collect, account for and pay 
over any tax imposed by this Act, who willfully fails to collect or 
truthfully account for and pay over such tax, and any person who 
willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax im-
posed by this Act or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to 
other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony .... 88 
This penalty, which remained applicable to excise tax violations 
only, was proposed for inclusion in the general criminal tax sec-
IT Moran, supra note 24, at 732. 
Ie Revenue Act of 1918, Ch. 18, section 1308(e), 40 Stat. 1057, 1143. This section reads: 
Id. 
Any person who willfully refuses to pay, collect, or truly account for and pay over any 
such tax shall in addition to other penalties provided by law be liable to a penalty of 
the antount of the tax evaded, or not paid, collected, or accounted for and paid over, 
to be assessed and collected in the sante manner as taxes are assessed and collected: 
Provided, However, That no penalty shall be assessed under this subdivision for any 
offense for which a penalty may be assessed under authority of section 3176 of the 
Revised Statutes, as antended, or of section 605 or 620 of this Act, or for any offense 
for which a penalty has been recovered under section 3256 of the Revised Statutes. 
I. Moran, supra note 24, at 733 . 
•• Id. at 737 . 
• , Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 176, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) . 
• 1 Moran, supra note 24, at 740 . 
•• Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 176,43 Stat. 253 § 1017(b) (emphasis added). 
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tion. S4 Subsequent tax revenue acts made all excise tax penalties 
applicable to social security taxes.SCI In 1939, the Code was once 
again consolidated and penalties relating to income and excise 
taxes were separately stated. S8 The graduated concept of misde-
meanor to felony was not altered.s7 The 100% penalty, still con-
fined to excise taxes, remained applicable only to the criminal tax 
provisions. S8 
C. Tax Payment Act of 1943 
In 1943, Congress enacted the Tax Payment Act (the "Act") 
which added excise tax penalties to the requirement to withhold 
income taxes.41 The Act made clear that the responsibility for 
withholding and paying the tax rested with the employer. What 
was left unclear was the relationship of the Act to the withholding 
provisions of the 1935 Social Security Act. The Conference Report 
explained that the purposes of the legislation were "to promote ef-
ficiency and flexibility in the administration of the tax by the Gov-
ernment and the operations of the employer."42 Ultimately, the 
Act was read into the Social Security Act of 1935 and excise tax 
penalties were imposed for failure to withhold income taxes.4S Con-
gress infused social security taxes with withholding taxes in one 
fell swoop, devoid of explication. By dismantling, rearranging, and 
amending a few provisions, the 100% penalty could now be charac-
terized as an alternative means of at-source taxation!4 
.. Moran, supra note 24, at 740 . 
.. Id. at 745-47; Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, § 807(a), 49 Stat. 620, 638. 
a. Int. Rev. Code of 1939; see also Moran, supra note 24, at 745-46. 
aT Id . 
.. Id. at 747 . 
• , Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 68, 57 Stat. 126 (1943) (codified in 
U.S.C.A. §123) . 
•• H.R. Rep. No. 510, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943), reprinted in 1943 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2-41, 2-
55. The Conference Report explained the modification: "Section 1627 under the Senate bill 
provides that all provisions of law, including penalties, applicable with respect to the social 
security tax on employees . . . shall, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with the 
provisions of new 8ubchapter D of chapter 9, be applicable with respect to the tax imposed 
under that subchapter." Id. at 2-56. See also Moran, supra note 24, at 748 . 
• a H.R. Rep. No. 510, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943), reprinted in 1943 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2-41, 2-
56 . 
•• Moran, supra note 24, at 748. "Collected at the source" refers to where the transaction 
took place. 
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D. 1954 Code Codification and Genesis of Section 6672 
The final major overhaul of the Code occurred in 1954. 'The 
100% penalty, now section 6672, was severed from the criminal 
provisions of earlier revenue acts and consolidated with the non-
criminal penalties.4G This initiative was undertaken to achieve pro-
cedural order and to combine all administrative provisions to-
gether in Subtitle F.48 Section 6672, no longer a separate criminal 
penalty, was incorporated into the "Assessable Penalties" of sub-
part B.47 As with earlier acts, Congress expressed no intent to alter 
its meaning by the procedural switch.48 
. While the legislative history of section 6672 may not illuminate 
the congressional intent concerning that provision, it is indisputa-
ble that the penalty was originally part of the criminal tax penal-
ties. Recognizing this historical antecedent is critical to a correct 
interpretation of the statute. Although a judge's responsibility is to 
interpret the text of the statute and not necessarily to "reconstruct 
the intentions of legislators,"48 such restraint can and should occur 
only if the language is unambiguous. However, if the text in ques-
tion is ambiguous, it is necessary for the judge to "rationalize the 
law - make those adjustments that coexisting texts require in order 
that the corpus juris on a whole makes sense."GO In the construc-
tion of section 6672, this element of judicial scrutiny has been no-
ticeably absent. 
III. "RESPONSIBLE PERSON" - A REALITY TEST 
A. The Mazo Formula 
Prior to 1979, courts had no benchmark for determining who was 
a "responsible person." In 1979, the Fifth Circuit decided Mazo v . 
•• Int. Rev. Code of 1954 §6672 . 
•• H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4137, 
4543 . 
• 7 Moran, supra note 24, at 749 . 
•• H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4137, 
·4568 . 
•• Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1005 (1992). 
eo See, e.g., Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2487-88, 2490-91 (1991) 
(Scalia, J., Concurring); Antonin Scalia, Speech on Use of Legislative History (delivered 
between Fall, 1985 and Spring, 1986 at various law schools) (transcriptS on file at Harvard 
Law School Library). 
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United States. III The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that 
liab~lity is predicated on actual knowledge of the tax liability, 
choosing instead to fashion a three-part test to satisfy the inquiry 
concerning responsibility: "responsibility is a matter of status, 
duty and authority, not knowledge."IIl! Courts must consider all 
"three factors in assessing a corporate officer's potential liability for 
non-payment of taxes. liS The status analysis focuses on the person's 
position within the corporate hierarchy, e.g. director, shareholder, 
or officer.1I4 The determination concerning duty shifts the focus to 
responsibility and is occasionally, but not often, set forth explicitly 
or implicitly in corporate minutes,1I1I articles of incorporationll6 or 
corporate by-laws.1I7 Finally, the authority analysis considers who 
had power to control the decision-making process by which funds 
were allocated to creditors other than the government. 
Since Mazo, courts have applied this three-part test to deter-
mine whether an individual is a "responsible person." The test 
makes eminent sense if applied correctly. But in numerous cases 
decided after Mazo, courts have altered the analysis, using status 
to reach the issue of whether the person's duty entailed the obliga-
tion to pay creditors. This revision of the test is both confusing 
and unwise. For high corporate officials, as opposed to bookkeep-
ers who typically perform ministerial rather than discretionary 
acts, duty might be easily derived from status. On the other hand, 
non-officeholders and employees, including those who work for 
charitable organizations, also have been held liable for the pen-
alty.1I8 Even this extension of liability would be acceptable if the 
., Mazo v. United States, 591 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979). 
•• Id. at 1156 . 
•• In Mazo, the officers protested the district court's decision granting the government's 
motion for summary judgment by claiming that each had title and position without author-
ity. The Fifth Circuit concluded that they were responsible persons both before and after 
the tax liability accrued under the statute since, "to paraphrase an aphorism of the last 
President Harry Truman, the corporate buck stopped with them." Id. at 1152. They were 
therefore under a duty to use the after-acquired funds to satisfy the tax obligation. Id. at 
1157 . 
.. Bloom v. United States, 272 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1959); Shepherd v. United States, 38 
A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 11 76-6103 (E.D. Mich. 1976); White v. United States, 372 F.2d 513 (Cl. 
Ct. 1967) . 
.. Nolan v. United States, 829 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1987) . 
.. Schweitzer v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 309, 312 (D. Neb. 1961). 
'7 United States v. Strebler, 313 F.2d 402, 404 (8th Cir. 1963) . 
.. See In re Stanley, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 50,480, 85,655 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (holding 
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factors were weighted properly, with a clear focus on authority. 
However, as one commentator has correctly noted: "Status as a 
separate factor tends to skew the focus of the inquiry."119 While 
status may be relevant to the inquiry because it could be indicative 
of duty, the proper test should focus on duty and authority be-
cause these are key indicators of responsibility. 
Without a proper, balanced focus, courts cannot function as a 
laboratory for reflection, increasing the propensity for an arbitrary 
or unjust result. This propensity became a reality in a series of 
appellate cases decided in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. In 
Howard v. United States,60 the taxpayer Howard, a director, mi-
nority shareholder, Treasurer and Executive Vice-President, was in 
charge of the corporation's day-to-day business affairs.61 Howard 
issued a check to the Service but Jennings, the President and ma-
jority shareholder, ordered Howard not to pay the Service any 
more money.62 He also relieved Howard of his duties for several 
weeks.63 After reinstating Howard, Jennings instructed him not to 
pay any bills without his approval.64 
Even though Howard did not have ultimate authority over cor-
porate affairs, the court imposed liability, finding that Howard had 
sufficient authority to be deemed a "responsible person." Defining 
"authority" as the "effective power to pay," the court concluded 
Howard was so vested because he signed checks to creditors other 
than the government, and these checks had been issued by How-
ard's signature alone without the approval of the chief executive 
officer.611 The court noted: "The fact that Jennings might well have 
fired Howard had he disobeyed Jennings' instructions and paid the 
taxes does not make Howard any less responsible for their pay-
controlling persons of anti-poverty organizations are liable for the 100% penalty). See also 
Mulcahy v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 656 (S.D. Tex. 1964) (asserting that a person who is 
merely counsel for a corporation may be held liable to the 100% penalty, thereby denying 
the parties request for injunction) . 
•• See Hungerford, supra note 21, at 463. 
80 711 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1983) . 
• , Id. at 731. The chances of a person being found responsible are heightened if s/he 
occupies more than a single position, particularly if one of those positions places the person 
close to corporate finances. See infra note 81 and accompanying text . 
•• Howard, 711 F.2d at 731. 
•• Id . 
... Id . 
.. Id. at 734. 
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ment."66 Howard's obligation under section 6672 was ostensibly 
paramount to following the directives of his superior. 
According to the court, Howard had the status and the requisite 
authority to pay creditors even though the authority was not ple-
nary. But Howard's authority did not extend to the payment of 
taxes. The court's failure to acknowledge this indispensable provi-
sion of the statute indicates that Howard was wrongly decided. De-
spite the weighty public interest in ensuring payment of govern-
ment trust funds, the judicial expansion in Howard is unjustified 
and places persons like Howard in a virtual catch-22: not following 
his superior's directive would have subjected him to termination 
while following the directive would have subjected him to enor-
mous penalties. 
Howard represents an errant departure from the pronounce-
ments of earlier courts and a renunciation of the final word test 
first articulated in Adams v. United States.67 Under this test, a 
person is responsible if he had the final word over what bills, in-
cluding taxes, should be paid.68 In Howard, the court clearly ac-
knowledged the taxpayer's limited ability to make these decisions 
but focused instead on his position within the corporate structure 
and his authority to sign small checks without the approval of Jen-
nings. One wonders how the court would have decided this case if 
Howard had in fact paid the Service in small dollar increments co-
terminous with his authority. Based on the Fifth Circuit's analysis, 
Howard not only would have been assessed for the balance of the 
tax, he also would have been terminated. 
Despite the analytical flaws of Howard, the Eleventh Circuit 
88 Id. The court was unaffected by Howard's concern regarding job tenure: 
Id. 
Howard had the status, duty and authority to pay the taxes owed, and would only 
have lost that authority after he had paid them .... Had Jennings fired Howard for 
paying the taxes, Howard would have at least fulfilled his legal obligations (footnote 
omitted). Faced with the possibility of leaving the frying pan with only minor burns, 
Howard chose instead to stay on in the vain hope of avoiding the fire. While we 
appreciate the difficulty of his position, we cannot condone his abdication of the re-
sponsibility imposed upon him by law. 
87 504 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1974). 
88 With the eventual solidification of the Mazo test, the final word standard, defined as 
"ultimate control," was replaced with "significant [not ultimate, nor exclusive] control." 
The effect of this alteration was to increase the likelihood of a superficial judicial analysis to 
justify the government's imperative of securing the trust fund taxes. 
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adopted its holding without scrutiny in Roth v. United States.8S 
Roth, who was neither a director nor a stockholder of the corpora-
tion, was held liable for his employer's failure to pay withholding 
taxes despite the fact that he was specifically instructed by Dob-
bins, the company's CEO, not to pay.70 The court essentially con-
cluded that no instruction by Dobbins could effectively bar an oth-
erwise responsible person from paying these funds in accordance 
with the law. Even after he was instructed by Dobbins not to pay 
the taxes, Roth continued to make wage deductions knowing that 
he could not transmit funds to the government.71 The statute cre-
ates a distinct obligation on every responsible officer to remit the 
withheld taxes to the Service.72 Therefore, Roth was a responsible 
person as a matter of law.7s As in Howard, the court decided that 
Roth was under no obligation to obey directives from Dobbins not 
to pay the taxes.74 
In dissent, Judge Godbold correctly explained that section 6672 
was not intended to impose liability when a person fails to exercise 
authority which he did not have, or - even if he had authority -
when his failure to exercise such authority was not willful.71~ Al-
though Roth could sign checks, the employer had withdrawn his 
authority to choose which creditors to pay.78 Godbold asserted: 
"[R]esponsibility to pay must derive from status and authority, 
not status and authority from responsibility to pay."77 
The district court in Roth had explicitly rejected Howard, stat-
ing that the decision was a "totally surprising and unnecessary de-
parture" from existing law and that it "unjustifiably and harshly 
penalizes an individual who acted as would any reasonable man 
under those circumstances."78 Nonetheless, simply because Roth 
e. 779 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1986). 7. Id. at 1571-72. 
71 Id. at 1571. 
7' Id. at 1572. 7. Id . 
.. Id . 
.. Id. at 1574. (Godbold, C. J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.) 7. Id. at 1573. 
77 Id. at 1575. 
7. 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 9319, 83,730 (N.D. Ala. 1984). Concerned with the severe 
ramifications of Howard, the court asserted: 
This court is therefore quite surprised that the Howard court announced a rule that 
now requires employees to make the hard and very difficult decision of facing unem-
ployment or gambling that the company will pay the taxes at some future date. An 
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had some uncontestable check-writing authority, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit reversed,79 despite the fact that such authority did not extend 
to writing checks to the Service. 
Both Howard and Roth are examples of judicial fact-finding 
gone awry. Neither employee had authority to direct the required 
payment to the Service. As a result, the holdings in both cases are 
unduly severe and incompatible with the language in section 6672 
which requires the employee to be under a duty to pay the tax. 
B. The Elaboration of Mazo's "Control" [Authority] Factor 
Although Mazo established the three-part test concerning re-
sponsible persons, without more, the test is difficult if not impossi-
ble to apply. Section 6672 cases are fact-intensive and often the 
line between sufficient and insufficient control is unclear. For ex-
ample, it has been held that exercising authority to co-sign checks 
is not in and of itself enough to impose responsibility.80 
Courts have used a number of factors to determine whether the 
requisite degree of control exists. These factors are: 
(1) The identity of corporate officers, directors and 
shareholders;81 
Id. 
employee lacking a determinative voice as to which creditors will be paid should not 
be faced with such a choice. 
•• Roth, 779 F .2d at 1572. 
8. Haffa v. United States, 516 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1975). 
81 The assumption is that high-ranking officials can exercise decision-making authority. 
This includes the authority to divert funds to preferred creditors. In nearly all reported 
cases, the responsible person has been either a shareholder, director or officer of the corpo-
rate entity. Often, the responsible person has several titles. 
PRE-SECTION 6672: Bloom v. United States, 272 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1959) (majority 
shareholder, president and chief executive officer); In re Haynes, 88 F. Supp. 379 (D.Kan. 
1949) (shareholder, director, president). 
SECTION 6672·FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEAL: McDonald v. United States, 939 F.2d 
916 (11th Cir. 1991) (shareholder and president); Kizzier v. United States, 598 F.2d 1128 
(8th Cir. 1979) (shareholder, president and treasurer); Turner v. United States, 423 F.2d 448 
(9th Cir. 1970) (director and vice-president); George v. United States, 819 F.2d 1008 (11th 
Cir. 1987) (shareholder, director, vice-president); Frazier v. United States, 304 F.2d 528 (5th 
Cir. 1962) (shareholder and president). 
SECTION 6672·FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: Sherman v. United States, 490 F. 
Supp. 747 (E.D. Mi. 1980) (director and president); Goebert v. United States, 412 F. Supp. 
356 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (shareholder and president); Braden v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 1189 
(S.D. Ohio 1970) (shareholder, director and treasurer). 
SECTION 6672eCLAIMS COURTeCOURT OF CLAIMS: Schultz v. United States, 19 
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(2) The duties of the officer as outlined in the corporate by-
laws;82 
. (3) The identity of individuals who prepared taxes forms;83 
(4) The identity of individuals who hired and fired personnel;84 
and 
(5) The identity of individuals who controlled the financial af-
fairs of the corporation. This usually refers to individuals who pos-
sess the ability to write checks on behalf of the corporation.811 
Cl.Ct. 280 (1990) (shareholder and president); Burack v. United States, 461 F.2d 1282 (Ct. 
Cl. 1972) (shareholder and vice president) . 
•• McDermitt v. United States, 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 50,094 (S.D. Ohio ·1991); 
United States v. Strebler, 313 F.2d 402 (8th Cir. 1963). 
88 For variations on the tax preparation theme, see Godfrey v. United States, 748 F.2d 
1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (concluding that mechanical duties of signing checks and prepar-
ing tax returns are not determinative of liability); McGlothin v. United States, 720 F.2d 6, 8 
(6th Cir. 1983) (providing that to be "responsible," it is not necessary that a person be the 
one who prepared tax returns); Labowitz v. United States, 352 F.Supp. 202, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972) (providing that signing of tax returns combined with part payment agreement was 
tantamount to an admission of liability); Peck v. United States, 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 
50,208 (D. Md. 1991) (concluding that signing of the forms goes to the issue of knowledge of 
tax delinquency, not necessarily control over the payment function) . 
.. Thibodeau v. United States, 828 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir. 1987) (indicia of responsi-
bility includes the duty to hire and fire employees); Moore v. United States, 465 F.2d 514, 
517 (5th Cir. 1972) (taxpayer had the authority to hire and fire employees); IRS. v. Blais, 
612 F. Supp. 700, 707 (D. Mass. 1985) (taxpayer, exercising power of attorney, hired and 
fired employees); Gold v. United States, 506 F. Supp. 473, 478 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (taxpayer 
tacitly approved the corporation's hiring decisions); Labowitz v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 
202, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("In considering who the responsible person is under section 6672 
the court may also consider the identity of the individual who hired and controlled the 
employees"); Schultz v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 280, 284 (1990) (taxpayer exercised fmal 
authority over personnel decisions); White v. United States, 372 F.2d 513, 517 (Ct. Cl. 1967) 
(taxpayer hired and laid off employees). 
88 Check signing authority assumes a particular saliency in determining whether signifi-
cant control over corporate funds exists. Significantly, it demonstrates the ability to move 
money. In almost all cases where liability was upheld, the taxpayer had either full signatory 
or co-signatory status on corporate checking accounts. 
PRE-SECTION 6672: Wiggins v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Tenn. 1960). 
SECTION 6672·FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEAL: 1ST CIRCUIT - Thomsen v. United 
States, 887 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1989); Caterino v. United States, 794 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986); 
Harrington v. United States, 504 F.2d 1306 (1st Cir. 1974). 2ND CIRCUIT - Hochstein v. 
United States, 900 F.2d 543 (2nd Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2967 (1992). 5TH CIR-
CUIT - Morgan v. United States, 937 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1991); Wood v. United States, 808 
F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1987); Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1983); Mazo v. 
United States, 591 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979); Genins v. United 
States, 489 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1974); Brown v. United States, 464 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1972), 
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 908 (1973); Moore v. United States, 465 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1972); 
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These factors are non-exclusive and generally guide a court in 
Mueller v. Nixon, 470 F.2d 1348 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 949 (1972); Newsome 
v. United States, 431 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1970); Hewitt v. United States, 377 F.2d 921 (5th 
Cir. 1967); Cash v .. Campbell, 346 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1965); Frazier v. United States, 304 
F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1962). 6TH CIRCUIT - Collins v .. United States, 848 F.2d 740 (6th Cir. 
1988); Gephart v. United States, 818 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1987); Calderone v. United States, 
799 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1986); 7TH CIRCUIT - Purdy Co. of Ill. v. United States, 814 F.2d 
1183 (7th Cir. 1987); Wright v. United States, 809 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1987); Flan v. United 
States, 326 F. 2d 356, 358 (7th Cir. 1964). 8TH CIRCUIT - Kizzier v. United States, 598 
F.2d 1128 (8th Cir. 1979); Emshwiller v. United States, 565 F.2d 1042, 1045 (8t!.t Cir. 1977); 
United States v. Strebler, 313 F.2d 402 (8th Cir. 1963). 9TH CIRCUIT - Teel v. United 
States, 529 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1976); Turner v. United States, 423 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1970). 
11TH CIRCUIT - Williams v. United States, 931 F.2d 805 (11th Cir. 1991); Smith v. United 
States, 894 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1990); George v. United States, 819 F.2d 1008 (11th Cir. 
1987); Thibodeau v. United States, 828 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1987); Roth v. United States, 
779 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1986). 
SECTION 6672·FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: Carlson v. United States, 91-1 U.S . 
. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 50,262 (D. Utah 1991); Peek v. United States, 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 
50,208 (D. Md. 1991); Mattingly v. United States, 711 F. Supp. 1535 (D. Nev. 1989); Causey 
v. United States, 683 F. Supp. 1381 (M:D. Ga. 1988); Simpson v. United States, 664 F. Supp. 
43 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); IRS v. Blais, 612 F. Supp. 700 (D. Mass 1985); Huggins v. United 
States, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 9192 (N.D. Tex. 1984); Hildebrand v. United States, 563 
F. Supp. 1259 (D. N.J. 1983); Verdung v. United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 9324 
(N.D. Ill. 1983); Silberberg v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 744 (E.D.N.Y. 1981);Gold v. 
United States, 506 F. Supp. 473 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); Sherman v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 
747 (E.D. Mich. 1980); United States v. Newell, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 119178 (S.D. Fla. 
1978); Goebert v. United States, 412 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Hoeniger v. United 
States, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 9296 (S.D. N.Y. 1976); Shepherd v. United States, 38 
A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 11 76-5332 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Jacoby v. United States, 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) 11 9853 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Adams v. United States, 35 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 11 75-583 
(W.O. Wisc. 1974); Garnett v. United States, 385 F. Supp. 665 (E.D. Ky. 1974); Miller v. 
United States, 33 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 11 74-1007 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Stake v. United States, 347 
F. Supp. 823 (D. Minn. 1972); Braden v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D. Ohio 1970); 
Guthrie v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Wisc. 1970); National Bank of Commerce 
v. Phinney, 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 9512 (S.D. Tex. 1965); United States v. Sefansky, 16 
A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 11 65-5176 (E.D. Mich. 1965); Schweitzer v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 
309 (D. Neb. 1961). 
SECTION 66720CLAIMS COURToCOURT OF CLAIMS: Schultz v. United States, 19 Cl. 
Ct. 280 (1990); Heimark v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 15 (1989); Stewart v. United States, 19 
Cl. Ct. 1 (1989); McCarty v. United States, 437 F.2d 961 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Barrett v. United 
States, 580 F.2d 449 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Bolding v. United States, 565 F.2d 663 (Ct. Cl. 1977); 
Bauer v. United States, 543 F.2d 142 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (noting that U[i)n each case in this court 
. in which a person was found to possess the requisite 'duty' under section 6672 of the code, it 
has been established by the evidence that he actually signed or co-signed corporate 
checks"); Burack v. United States, 461 F.2d 1282 (Ct. Cl. 1972); White v. United States, 372 
F.2d 513 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
SECTION 6672·BANKRUPTCY COURT: Matter of Osborn, 4 B.R. 431 (Bankr. W.O. 
Mo. 1979). 
Check signing authority may not be dispositive if other signatures are required. Compare 
Fried v. United States, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 9372 (S.D. Fla. 1968), holding that 
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determining whether an individual is a responsible party. No one 
factor is determinative.8e 
C. The Scope of the "Responsible Person" Net: Who's In/ 
Who's Out 
Section 6672 triggers a 100% penalty against "[a]ny person re-
quired to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax. "87 
The Code defines person in section 6671(b) as: "an officer or em-
ployee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, 
who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to per-
form the act in respect of which the violation occurs."88 The 
Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of who qualifies as a person for 
the purposes of this section in United States v. Graham.89 Graham 
contended that he was not a "person" within the meaning of 
6671(b) since he functioned as an outside board member and was 
not an executive officer or employee. Rejecting this narrow con-
struction as inherently contrary to the purpose and spirit of sec-
tion 6672, the court concluded that while the term "person" in-
cludes officer and employee, it does not exclude other 
classifications: "The section must be construed to include all those 
so connected with a corporation as to be responsible for the per-
formance of the act in respect of which the violation occurred. "90 
plaintiff was not a responsible person and had no duty to pay the tax, with Kraus v. United 
States, 85-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 9310 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), holding that veto power over the 
disbursement of corporate funds constituted sufficient authority. Kraus was without author-
ity to sign checks in excess of $150 without the approval of his supervisor. The court deter-
mined that Kraus had the authority to block the dissipation of funds simply by refusing to 
place his signature on the checks used to pay other creditors. "As a co-signer on all checks 
who knowingly divert[ed) trust funds to other sources, he [was) personally liable." Kraus, 
85-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) at 87,752 . 
.. See McDermitt v. United States, 954 F.2d 1245 (6th Cir. 1992) . 
•• I.R.C. § 6672(a) . 
.. I.R.C. § 6671(b) (emphasis added) . 
• 0 309 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962). 
00 Id. at 212. This broad definition of "person" was solidified by the Sixth Circuit in 
Mueller v. Nixon, 470 F.2d 1348, 1350 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 949 (1973). 
Mueller, who was neither an employee nor an officer of· the corporation, was nonetheless 
found to be within the scope of § 6671(b) because he had complete control over corporate 
operations. "The definition of 'person' employed by Congress is not phrased in terms of 
exclusion ... .' [B)y use of the word 'include[s), the definition suggests a calculated indefi-
niteness with respect to the outer limits of the term' defined." Id. at 1350 (quoting First 
Nat'l Bank In Plant City, Plant City, Florida v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969». The view 
that authority need not arise out of any "officer or employee" status within the corporate 
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Since Graham, courts have expanded the reach of section 6672 
to include lenders and sureties,91 an attorney who functions 
outside the corporate hierarchy,911 and an accounting firm.9s The 
hierarchy is generally accepted. See United States v. Lawrence, 327 F. Supp. 650 (N.D. Tex. 
1971) (finding that the sole beneficiary of deceased responsible person was a person liable 
for the 100% penalty under the Texas Probate Court); Regan & Co. v. United States, 290 F. 
Supp. 470 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that a joint venture and its president were both persons 
required to collect, truthfully account for and pay over withholding taxes); Melillo v. United 
States, 244 F. Supp. 323 (E.D.N.Y. 1965) (finding that plaintiff, by virtue of control over the 
finances of a bakery he was purchasing, was a responsible person); Flan v. United States, 
326 F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1964) (finding that president and principal stockholder was a "per-
son"); Tiffany v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 700 (D. N.J. 1963) (noting that controlling 
stockholder who exercised authority over operations was a responsible person); Botta v. 
Scanlon, 314 F.2d 392, 394 (2nd Cir. 1963) (reference to officers and employees in § 6671(b) 
may be exemplary and not inclusive). 
01 Pacific National Insur. Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 26 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 398 
U.S. 937 (1970). The court rejected the argument that Pacific was not the employer of Cen-
tral's employees nor an officer or employee of Central: 
[I]t is our conclusion that the language of these provisions is broad enough to reach 
an entity which assumes the function of determining whether or not an employer will 
pay over taxes withheld from its employees; that this reading of the language serves 
the evident purpose of the statute; and that the district court's findings that Pacific 
performed this function with respect to Central is fully justified by the record. 
It would frustrate [the statute's] purpose needlessly to imply a condition limiting 
the application of the section to those nominally charged with controlling disburse-
ments of a corporate employer, thus immunizing those who, through agreement with 
or default of those nominally responsible, have exercised this corporate function in 
fact. 
Id. at 30-31. See also Anderson v. United States, 561 F.2d 162 (8th Cir. 1977). The court's 
emphasis on substance over form was even more evident in United States v. Security Pacific 
Business Credit, 956 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1992). In a case of first impression, the Seventh 
Circuit interpreted the intersection of § 6672, § 3505(b) and cumulative liability. Rejecting 
the lender's argument that one adjudged a responsible person will ipso facto face a 
§ 3505(b) violation and that "Congress must have had a reason for not making the penalty 
in § 6672 equal to the sum of th~ tax due and interest on the tax," the court concluded: 
[L]egislative omniscience is not a realistic assumption .... [I]t belongs to a style of 
statutory interpretation that places greater emphasis on the text of statutes than on 
intentions behind them . . . . Liability for two wrongs that inflict two d,istinct harms 
is not generally less just because the two wrongs are committed by one person rather 
than by two. 
Id. at 707. The cumulation of penalties was upheld. Id . 
•• In Brown v. United States, 464 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1972), the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals imposed § 6672 liability on an attorney who became nominal president of his cli-
ent's corporation. The court was not persuaded by Brown's argument that he possessed only 
token managerial responsibility and his co-signature on company checks was "literally a 
rubber stamp." Id. at 591. While Brown may have lacked the direct personal duty to collect, 
account for, and pay over the taxes, he co-signed all corporate checks, actively participated 
in efforts to secure additional financing for relief, and made the decision to terminate Gulf's 
operations. In a clear caveat, the court said, "Were we to hold to the contrary - that lack of 
HeinOnline -- 13 Va. Tax Rev. 245 1993-1994
1993] 26 U.S.C. Section 6672 245 
point is that courts have not allowed persons or entities who have 
the actual power to pay available corporate funds to the Service to 
escape liability based on a literal reading of the term "responsible 
person." 
D. The Justification for a Bright-Line Test 
1. The Need to Protect the Innocent 
The built-in safeguards of section 6672 offer protection to those 
who do not have control over the financial affairs of the corpora-
tion, specifically, disbursements of funds and priorities of pay-
ments to creditors.94 Even assuming requisite control can be estab-
individual authority to sign corporate checks insulated Brown from liability - we would 
surely open the door to protective co-signing arrangements. The effect of such a holding 
would tend to emasculate section 6672." Id. at 591. 
•• In re Quattrone Accountants, 895 F.2d 921 (3rd Cir. 1990) (an accounting firm which 
has significant control over the debtor's finances, i.e. authority to pay monthly bills without 
prior approval, the unrestricted use of a signature stamp of the president and treasurer of 
the company, and the authority to determine priority of payment is "responsible"). Id. at . 
927. But, courts have correctly responded to situations where the Service becomes too zeal-
ous in pursuing persons with significant authority, regardless of whether they are directors, 
officers, or shareholders. See In re Gary Ray Brown v. United States, 130 B.R. 456 (Bankr. 
W.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that a debtor who is hired as temporary manager for six weeks but 
who has no authority to sign checks, hire key employees, prepare tax returns, or decide 
priority of payment, cannot be held "responsible"); In re Tripplett, 115 B.R. 955 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that a temporary manager of a church academy, who had authority 
to sign checks once others determined who should be paid, was not a "responsible" person); 
see also Simpson v. United States, 664 F. Supp. 43 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that a hospital's 
board of trustees, which did not function in or administer the day-to-day operations of the 
hospital, sign checks or participate in the crucial financial functions - collecting, accounting, 
or paying of withholding taxes - was not responsible: "[N]o rational individual would volun-
teer to serve on the board of a not-for-profit corporation, unless, at least, he were covered by 
a substantial insurance policy."). Id. at 49. See generally Doreen McCall, Comment, Who is 
a "Responsible Person" - The Overreaching Power of the Internal Revenue Service to Col-
lect Employer Withholding Taxes, 18 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 905 (1992). 
•• A person who lacks total control over fiscal affairs cannot be a responsible person. 
Bauer v. United States, 543 F.2d 142, 148 (Ct. Cl. 1976). In Bauer, the Court distinguished 
between control over fiscal areas versus the more technical areas of production, quality con-
trol and scheduling. Taxpayer was appointed rather than elected to the board of directors 
and the business operation did not subscribe to the customary corporate formalities of an-
nual meetings and minutes. See also Clouse v. United States, No. 88-1010, Slip op. (6th Cir. 
1989). In discussing Clouse's role in corporate affairs, the Sixth Circuit focused on his super-
vision of the manufacturing operation, a function tangential to the financial affairs of OC-
TRA. "The ability of Clouse, as a substantial creditor to negotiate for repayment of his 
debt, or as an unpaid landlord to lock out a tenant, is quite distinct from any corporate 
authority to direct payment of creditor." Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
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lished, unencumbered funds must be available.911 The law does not 
require satisfaction of tax liabilities where other creditors have 
perfected their interests.96 
On the other hand, the severity of the statute cannot be under-
estimated. It is harsh and far-reaching, intended to protect the 
government when responsible persons dip into the "trust fund" 
and deliberately allocate money for uses other than payment of the 
tax liability. Regardless of the amount of money involved, which 
can be virtually inconsequential, the act itself constitutes a prefer-
ence over the government, thus triggering the assessment. Once the 
assessment is generated, the taxpayer faces an extraordinary maze 
of presumptions and burdens, causing one commentator to note: 
"Section 6672 has no parallel in the tax legislation of the United 
States. "97 
2. Taxpayer Carries the Burden of Proof 
The taxpayer carries the burden of proving that he was not a 
responsible party in both refund claims and the counterclaim;96 
this is a difficult burden to meet because assessments are made in 
summary fashion and are presumptively correct. In an attempt to 
avoid having to meet this burden, plaintiffs have asserted due pro-
cess claims against assessment procedures. 
In Oliver v. United States, taxpayer claimed a due process viola-
tion when, after acquiring the entire administrative file, she could 
not glean the basis for the assessment.99 Taxpayer contende~ that 
she was denied an opportunity to challenge a presumptively cor-
rect assessment which she assumed the burden of rebutting.1oo The 
court conceded that "[f]airness may indeed require that the tax-
•• Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238 (1978). See also infra § 11(0)(5) . 
.. In re Premo, 116 B.R. 515 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1990) . 
.., See Moran, supra note 24 . 
.. Collins v. United States, 848 F.2d 740, 742 (6th Cir. 1988); Ruth v. United States, 823 
F.2d 1091, 1093 (7th Cir. 1987); Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 258 (6th Cir. 
1986); Sinder v. United States, 655 F.2d 729, 731 (6th Cir. 1981); see also McDermitt v. 
United States, 954 F.2d 1245, 1251 (6th Cir. 1992) (asserting that "[w)hen a party pays part 
of the penalty existing for failure to pay withheld taxes and the government counterclaims 
for the remainder of the refund, the taxpayer has the burden of proving that the assessment 
was wrong .... [and the) ass~sment is presumed to be correct."). 
" 921 F.2d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 1990). 
100 Id. at 921. 
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payer know the basis for an assessment."IOI However, the district 
court did not limit its inquiry to a differential review of the admin-
istrative record, but instead afforded the taxpayers a de novo trial 
with respect to the merits of their claim for a refund."lo2 Since 
taxpayer was given the usual discovery powers of a full adversarial 
proceeding, a due process violation could not be sustained.lo3 
Additionally, a taxpayer cannot assert a due process claim to re-
quire a judicial hearing prior to the Service's attachment of assets 
on partial payment satisfaction. In Cohn v. United States,I°4 the 
plaintiffs did not contest section 6672 liabilities but instead raised 
only constitutional claims. Plaintiffs' challenge was predicated on 
the ground that there was no judicial hearing to contest the impo-. 
sition of the section 6672 penalty. Even though plaintiffs met the 
jurisdictional requirement of partial payment, they remained re-
sponsible for the full assessment during the course of proceed-
ings. IOIi Plaintiffs claimed that they suffered a deprivation of prop-
erty without due process of law when they were forced to post' a 
security bond for the full amount of the assessment. IOe Relying on 
Phillips v. Commissioner,I°7 the court rejected plaintiffs' argument 
and reiterated the supremacy of the government's interest in pro-
tecting the collection of taxes: 
, 
[I]t has already been shown that the right of the United States to 
exact immediate payment and to relegate the taxpayer to a suit for 
recovery is paramount. The privilege of delayi~g payment pending 
immediate judicial review, by filing a bond, was granted by the 
sovereign as a matter of grace solely for the convenience of the 
taxpayer .108 
Once again, the decisions confirm the unique character of section 
6672 cases. Due process violations do not operate in the withhold-
ing tax context inasmuch as taxpayers receive the benefit of a trial 
101 Id. (quoting United States v. Stonehill, 702 F.2d 1288, 1297 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
102 Id. at 921. . 
loa Id. at 922 . 
• 04 399 F. Supp. 168 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) . 
• 00 Id. 
'OG Id . 
• 07 283 U.S. 589 (1931). 
'08 Id. at 170. See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1983); Kalb v. United States, 505 
F.2d 506 (2nd Cir. 1974); Bernardi v. United States, 74-1 USTC 119170 (N.D.Ill. 1973), aff'd 
per curiam, 507 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1974). 
HeinOnline -- 13 Va. Tax Rev. 248 1993-1994
248 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 13:225 
de novo with full discovery attendant to civil proceedings. The rule 
of law that withholding taxes are held in trust for the federal gov-
ernment is deemed a sufficient rational basis to justify the pre-
hearing seizure or attachment of assets requirement. This posture 
might be defensible if not for the Service's modus operandi in pur-
suing officers and high-ranking employees as a matter of course. 
Since collectability may well furnish the strongest inducement to 
bring a taxpayer within the firm grasp of section 6672, innocent 
persons may have their assets tied up for years while the Service 
continues its investigation. 
3. Right to Contribution is Unavailable 
Because section 6672 cases often involve multiple persons,109 the 
temptation for one person to claim less responsibility than another 
is substantial.110 The Service casts a wide net in which even per-
sons with severely limited authority are often caught. Predictably, 
courts have uniformly held that section 6672 tax liability is joint 
and several.lll Efforts to obtain contribution will usually fail. 
Clearly, under federal law, no such right has been recognized. ll2 
Specifically, the Sixth Circuit recently rebuffed an attempt to 
claim state law protection.113 
108 Decided cases affir!ll the Service's position that several persons usually have some de-
gree of responsibility for payroll and withholding matters, and each such person may be-
come a likely target. Scott v. United States, 354 F.2d 292 (Ct. Cl. 1965). 
110 The only § 6672 case to address gradations of culpability is McDermitt v. United 
States, 91-1 USTC ~ 50,094 (S.D. Ohio 1991). The McDermitt Court noted: 
Id. 
Of the three persons responsible for payment of MAC's [Mid-America Constructors, 
Inc.] withholding taxes, ... Miranda is probably the least culpable. [He] exercised 
very little control over the day-to-day corporate finances, including the payment of 
taxes, of MAC. He did, however, possess and exercise the authority to determine the 
priority of payments to creditors, and the ability to payoff the tax liability to the 
IRS. Although he may not have realized the significance of this situation, he knew of 
the cash flow problems at MAC and the failure of MAC to timely pay over the with-
holding taxes. Miranda's failure ... was willful. 
111 Builder's Finance v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Mich. 1970). However, it is 
the Service's policy that they will not recover more than the total amount of the liability. 
United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 279 n. 12 (1978). 
1U Sinder v. United States, 655 F.2d 729, 732 (6th Cir. 1981). 
118 McDermitt, 954 F.2d at 1252. In asserting a right of contribution claim, McDermitt 
stated that section 6672 "does not ... foreclose a right to contribution under state law." Id. 
(quoting Swift v. Levesque, 614 F.Supp. 172, 173 (D.Conn. 1985». Subsection (E) of the 
applicable section of this code specifically states that the rule of contribution "does not 
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Although the right of contribution is foreclosed, taxpayers may 
be able to assert an equal protection claim to defeat the assess-
ment. A district court placed its imprimatur on equal protection 
claims in I.R.S. v. Blais.lH In Blais, the court was required to 
weigh the terms of the government's settlement of a refund action 
against another responsible person whose testimony would be used 
to dispose of the disputed issues at trial. Essentially, the settle-
ment was to be used to assess the credibility of the evidence of-
fered to support the government's remaining claim against Blais. 
The government insisted it had no obligation to provide such evi-
dence, although evidence of the settlement was offered. lUI Further, 
the government argued that "Congress had given it unlimited and 
unbridled discretion to settle with taxpayers."1l6 
Rejecting the government's argument, the court explained the 
scope of the equal protection penumbra: 
Congress has entrusted the Department of the Treasury and deriv-
atively the Internal Revenue Service with broad power to enforce 
our revenue laws. The ability of the government to collect each 
person's fair share of the federal burden is essential to any form of 
organized government. The power to collect, however, is not an un-
restricted power. The government must abide by the laws of the 
United States including constitutional, statutory, and decisional 
constraints against equal treatment.l17 
Even though the court ultimately held for the government, the 
opinion limited the parameters of the Service's authority and re-
quired the government to justify its decision to proceed against the 
taxpayer: "The law abhors power without accountability. Un-
policed power invites abuse and corruption. When the government 
has the power to affect the rights of third persons, it cannot do so 
irresponsibly and wholly without accountability."1l8 
Generally, the Code permits taxpayers, against whom the Service 
assesses deficiencies in income, estate and gift taxes, to contest the 
apply to breaches of trust in or of other fiduciary obligations." Id. Section 6672 violations 
fall squarely within this proscription. But see Cook v. United States, 765 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. 
Pa. 1991), where recovery under state law was permitted. 
11. 612 F. Supp. 700 (D. Mass. 1985). 
11& Id. at 703. 
118 Id. 
117 Id. at 703-04. 
118 Id. at 704. 
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liability prior to the payment of the tax.l19 As a result, some tax-
payers have advanced an equal protection argument claiming that 
the classification is constitutionally impermissible under the Fifth 
Amendment. In Cohn v. United States,120 plaintiffs unsuccessfully 
asserted this argument. Without any legal authority directly on 
point, the district court employed a traditional equal protection 
analysis to dismiss the plaintiffs' argument. Under this analysis, "a 
legislative classification must be sustained unless it is 'patently ar-
bitrary' and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate govern-
mental interest. "121 Since the government has a strong interest in 
the "prompt collection of its lawful revenue,"122 the distinction was 
justified: "[A]ssessments which provide, statistically, the greatest 
percentage of revenue should be paid over prior to a suit for re-
fund, especially in view of the fact that such money is held in trust 
for the Government. "I 23 
The equal protection analyses are fraught with confusion be-
cause no court has articulated an identifiable set of criteria to mea- . 
sure government conduct. Even in Blais, notwithstanding its ex-
alted protestations regarding equal protection, the court offered no 
substantive guidance on equal protection violations. Much like 
pornography, the court will recognize the appropriate case when it 
.sees it, but such a case has yet to surface. 
4. Delegation of Authority Fails as a Defense 
Once vested with authority to pay taxes for the employer, it is 
difficult for an individual to convince a court that such authority 
was delegated to a third person. In Bedford v. United States,124 
the district court held that an otherwise responsible employee can-
not avoid his responsibility by delegating it to a subordinate em-
ployee.1211 Similarly, in Lawrence v. United States,t26 the court 
110 The United States Tax Court possesses exclusive jurisdiction over these disputes. The 
Code does not confer jurisdiction unless the Service issues a statutory notice of deficiency 
and the taxpayer flies a timely petition for a hearing. I.R.C. §§ 6213, 7421, 7441. 
... 399 F. Supp. 168 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). 
111 Id. at 171 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973» . 
... Id. (quoting Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. I, 7 (1962» . 
.. a Id. at 172 . 
... 77·1 U.S. Tax Cas. \I 9308 (E.D. Wis. 1977). 
... Id. at 86863 . 
.. 8 299 F. Supp. 187 (N.D. Tex. 1969). 
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held that delegation of responsibility was irrelevant, because the 
power to revoke the delegation remained with the grantor.127 
Taxpayers may avoid liability by relinquishing their "responsible 
person" status prior to the withholding tax problem. In Dudley v. 
United States,128 Dudley, the president and principal shareholder, 
sent a check to the Service for the corporation's withholding taxes 
for the first quarter of 1960.129 The Service did not present the 
check to the bank until six weeks later at· which time it was dis-
honored and returned to the Service. Dudley testified that he was 
not aware that the check had been dishonored until the next. 
month when he went over the books with the company's account-
ant. There was no evidence that the Service or the bank notified 
Dudley of the check's status. ISO In addition, Dudley established 
that his authority, which included his control over the payment of 
checks, began to diminish the same month the company mailed the 
check to the Service. lSI 
A bench trial found Dudley liable for the unpaid taxes. On ap-
peal, the Ninth Circuit held that, with respect to Dudley's liability 
for the first quarter of 1960, there was no evidence demonstrating 
Dudley had knowledge of the tax delinquency: "Dudley may have 
been guilty of negligence but negligence is not willfulness . . . 
[W]here the taxpayer had reason to believe the check had been 
paid, and had not been notified to the contrary, it would under the 
circumstances found here dispel a finding of willfulness under the 
statute. "132 
In the majority of cases, the delegation defense addresses the is-
sue of willfulness, not the party's status as a responsible person. 
Once removed from fiscal affairs and no longer able to direct the 
corporate funds, the employee was protected from liability. Irre-
spective of which element of the statute is not satisfied, delegation 
is more apt to relieve corporate employees who are far removed 
from fiscal matters, rather than corporate presidents or majority 
shareholders who possess the general responsibility and authority 
II. Id. at 190. 
108 428 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1970). 
118 Id. at 1198. 
I •• Id. at 1198-99. 
lat Id. at 1201. 
18. Id. at 1200. 
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to avoid the default. 133 
5. "Availability of Funds" - A Term of Semantic Confusion 
When corporate entities begin to flounder, they often look to 
new leadership to revitalize the business. In Slodov v. United 
States/34 the Supreme Court addressed the extent to which suc-
cessor presidents and managers are liable under section 6672 if the 
prior "responsible person" dissipates all trust funds. In rejecting 
the government's argument that the statute imposed a trust on all 
cash received by the corporation after a taxpayer assumes control 
of a corporation, the Court determined that: 
[A] "responsible person" under § 6672 may violate the "pay over" 
requirement ... by willfully failing to pay over trust funds col-
lected prior to his accession to control when at the time he as-
sumed control the corporation has funds impressed with a trust 
under § 7501, but § 7501 does not impress a trust on after-ac-
quired funds, and the responsible person consequently does not vi-
olate § 6672 by willfully using employer funds for purposes other 
than satisfaction of the trust-fund claims of the United States 
when at the time he assumed control there were no funds with 
which to satisfy the tax obligation and the funds thereafter gener-
ated are not directly traceable to collected taxes referred to by the 
statute. 13& 
As a result, the Supreme Court limited the successor owner's liabil-
ity to after-acquired funds which were directly traceable to col-
lected taxes referred to by section 6672 of the Code.136 
... Cf. McDermitt v. United States, 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 11 50094, at 81377-78 (S.D. Ohio 
1991), afPd, 954 F.2d 1245 (6th Cir. 1992). in McDermitt, the constructive majority share-
holder, the president, and the secretary-treasurer were similarly assessed. Despite all indicia 
which demonstrated that McDermitt, the constructive majority shareholder, had superior 
control over the financial and general affairs of the corporation, the court also held the 
other two officers liable. Under the previous statutory provision, Int. Rev. Code of 1939 
§ 2707(d), this type of control vested in a high-ranking official would likely insulate a cor-
porate employee or officer from liability . 
• 84 436 U.S. 238 (1978) . 
• 86 Id. at 259-60. The legislative history of I.R.C. § 7501 provides: "Under existing law the 
liability of the person collecting and withholding the taxes to pay over the amount is merely 
a debt, and he cannot be treated as a trustee or proceeded against by distaint." S. Rep. No. 
558, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1934) . 
• 88 Thus, the Court evaded the crucial inquiry: For what funds is the trustee responsible? 
Professor Vasek adroitly addressed this issue: 
If the term "funds" is given the broadest meaning, total assets, the duty of the em-
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In Slodov, the Supreme Court based its decision in part on the 
rationale that holding a new "responsible person" liable for the 
taxes would discourage investors from revitalizing an imperiled' 
business operation and, assuming a successful turn-around, pre-
clude the government from receiving full satisfaction of the corpo-
rate debt. On the other hand, an original investor, who is held lia-
ble for the entire corporate tax debt, would not hamper a "white-
knight" transformation, because the successor "responsible per-
son" would not acquire the withholding tax liabilities of his prede-
cessor unless expressly provided for by the reorganization. 
Appellate courts, particularly the Eighth Circuit, have followed 
the lead of the United States Supreme Court.137 In Elmore v. 
United States,138 the court rejected the government's argument 
that Elmore should be liable for fourth quarter taxes because he 
paid wages and cost!; after the taxes for this period accrued: "[T]he 
record contains no evidence that the funds used for these purposes 
were traceable to trust funds or were otherwise anything but ac-
quired after Elmore's accession to control. "139 
ployer to withhold funds would apparently be satisfied as long as the business had 
assets immediately after the payment of wages equaling. the liability for the withheld 
taxes. The duty of accounting would be satisfied by merely recording on the em-
ployer's books the liability for the unpaid withheld taxes. If the term "funds" were 
given the meaning of net assets (total assets less total liabilities), the duty to with-
hold would be satisfied if the business had sufficient net assets to cover the liability 
for withheld taxes. The choice of the net asset definition could be premised on the 
theory that withholding taxes requires the withholding of assets in excess of those 
claimed by other creditors. 
Stephen J. Vasek, The Hidden Tax Trap of I.R.C. Section 6672, 67 Ky. L.J. 27, 50-51 
(1978). Furthermore, Slodov failed to resolve whether the responsible person will be liable 
for "directly traceable" funds to the extent of the directly traceable funds or the entire 
arrearage. While the latter construction subverts the intent of § 6672, at least one pre-
Slodov court construed the language in this fashion. Teel v. United States, 529 F.2d 903 (9th 
Cir. 1976). 
187 Kinnie v. United States, 994 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1993); Davis v. United States, 961 F.2d 
867, 871-78 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 969 (1993); Garsky v. United States, 600 
F.2d 86, 90-92 (7th Cir. 1979). 
188 843 F.2d 1128 (8th Cir. 1988). 
18. Id. at 1134. In Kenagy v. United States, 942 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1991), the sante court 
expanded on this point: 
A responsible person generally may not be penalized with respect to unpaid taxes 
accruing prior to the date s/he became a responsible person in an amount more than 
the unencumbered funds of the corporation in existence at that date. Unencumbered 
funds are those funds available after taking into account outstanding transactions. 
Id. at 465. Kenagy's definition of unencumbered was not the central issue in the case. 
Honey v. United States, 963 F.2d 1083, 1090 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 676 (1992). 
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In Honey v. United States,14·o the Eighth Circuit refined the def-
inition of "unencumbered funds." In Honey, the court conjectured 
that the jury did not find the responsible persons willful prior to 
October 31, 1985, because they were unaware of the unsatisfied tax 
liability.14l Relying on In re Premo/42 the court held that "funds 
are encumbered only where the taxpayer is legally obligated to use 
the funds for a purpose other than satisfying the preexisting em-
ployment tax liability and if that legal obligation is superior to the 
interest[s]" of the Service.143 
Applying this test through a two-part analysis, the court con-
cluded that non-segregated funds which are not secured by a prior 
lien, render the Service's interest subordinate to "certain perfected 
security interests in ... collateral, including inventory.m44 Having 
so concluded, the court 'logically proceeded to the next level and 
asserted that this perfected security interest did not prevent the 
use of funds in the corporate" account for the payment of the tax 
obligation. l46 According to the court, "[t]here [was] no evidence 
that Merchants restricted Phoenix's ability to use those funds to 
satisfy the preexisting tax obligation."146 
6. Taxpayer's Debt is Non-Dischargeable in Bankruptcy 
Since the Service does not shut down a company after learning 
of the tax deficiency, the company continues to operate, usually 
paying employees and only those creditors necessary to stay in 
business. Consequently, by the time the company folds, the trust 
fund liability can be sizeable. 
H. 963 F.2d 1083 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992). 
'41 Id. at 1089. 
H' 116 B.R. 515 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1990). 
, •• Honey, 963 F.2d at 1090. 
H. Id. at 1091 (quoting Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 257 (1978». 
H. Id. at 1091-92. 
,.. Id. The court rejected the argument that if Phoenix had paid the Service instead of its 
creditors, the corporation would have folded immediately and no money would have been 
available to pay back taxes. "[Ilt is no excuse that, as a matter of sound business judgment, 
the money was paid to suppliers and for wages in order to keep the corporation operating as 
a going concern - the government cannot be made an unwilling partner in a floundering 
business." Id. at 1093 (quoting Collins v. United States, 848 F.2d 740, 741-42 (6th Cir. 
1988». See also Thibodeau v. United States, 828 F.2d 1499, 1506 (11th Cir. 1987); Mazo v. 
United States, 591 F.2d 1151, 1154 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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In United States v. Sotelo,147 the Supreme Court held that lia-
bility under section 6672 was not dischargeable under section 
17a(l)(e) of the Bankruptcy Act. "The fact that "funds due [under 
section 6672] are referred to as a 'penalty' ... does not alter their 
essential character as taxes for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act," 
where, as here, the liability was based on failure to pay over rather 
than failure to initially collect. 148 
Examining the Bankruptcy Act, the majority recognized that its 
fundamental purpose was to establish a three-year limitation on 
taxes that would be non-dischargeable. Section 17a(l)(e) was 
added to ensure that a responsible person who had collected 
money from third persons could not be relieved of this obligation 
after having converted the money for his own use. 149 The court 
noted: "The overall policy of the Bankruptcy Act of giving a bank-
rupt a 'fresh start' cannot override Congress' specific intent in 
§ 17a(l)(e) to make a liability ... nondischargeable, especially 
since the contrary result would create an inequity between corpo-
rate officers and. individual entrepreneurs."lIiO Moreover, the court 
refused to extinguish liability on public policy grounds, noting: 
[W]e as judges cannot override the specific policy judgments made 
by Congress in enacting the statutory provisions .... The decision 
to hold an individual 'liable for a tax owed by a corporation,' ... 
was made when Internal Revenue Code § 6672 was passed, since it 
is that section which imposes the liability without regard for the 
individual's ability to pay.1I1l 
, "7 436 U.S. 268 (1978). 11 U.S.C. § 523 provides: 
A discharge under section(s) 727 [and] 1141 ... of this title does not discharge an 
individual debtor from any debt (1) for a tax or a customs duty - (A) of the kind 
and for the periods specified in 507(a)(2) or 507(a)(7) of this title. 
Section 507(a)(7) includes taxes which the debtor was required by law to withhold but failed 
to do so, thus rendering him liable for the tax. 11 U.S.C. § 507. See In re Shank, 792 F.2d 
829 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that the penalty provision of § 6672 of the Code is not dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy per § 523(a)(7), to the extent [that] such debt is for a fine, pen-
alty or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit); In re Madia, 68 
B.R. 11 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) (claiming that tax fraud penalties are dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy if imposed more than three years before debtors file their bankruptcy petition). See 
also McKay v. United States, 957 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1992); In re Byrum, 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) 11 50,257 (D. Calif. 1992). However, this exception has not been extended to § 6672 
penalties . 
••• Sotelo, 436 U.S. at 275 . 
••• Id. at .276 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 372, p.6). 
'00 Id. at 269. 
10. Id. at 279. 
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In a sharp dissent, Justice Rehnquist accused the majority of us-
ing a twisted analysis of the Bankruptcy Act to reach its deci-
sion. 1II2 Criticizing the majority for relying on a Treasury Depart-
ment letter setting forth its position on dischargeability instead of 
the legislation which Congress enacted,1&8 Justice Rehnquist cor-
rectly observed that there was an omission in the majority's deci-
sion. The initial question should have been whether the amounts 
for which respondent is liable "is a 'tax' legally due and owing by 
him."U4 Section 6672 specifically states "penalty", not "tax". Sec-
tion 17a(1)(e) was not modified to include penalties.m Moreover, 
the majority's opinion, Justice Rehnquist noted, ignores the funda-
mental goal of rehabilitating bankrupts: 
[T]here is unfortunately nothing in the Court's reasoning which 
would prevent the same liability from surviving bankruptcy in the 
case of a comptroller, accountant, or bookkeeper who reaped none 
of the fruits of entrepreneurial success other than continued em-
ployment in the corporation, and in some cases possibly not even 
that .... So long as the Government in its zeal for the collection of 
revenue may persuade a bankruptcy court that a corporate em-
ployee comes within the Court's Delphic construction of 26 U.S.C. 
§ 6672 . . : such a person will be denied the "fresh start" which 
Congress clearly intended to enhance by the 1966 amendments to 
the Bankruptcy Act. 1118 
Compounding this problem is that once corporate bankruptcy is 
declared, securecl claims are given a priority over everything except 
for administrative expenses allowed under section 503(b) of Title 
11. U7 Taxes not dischargeable in bankruptcy such as trust fund 
taxes are given seventh priority. us Money usually left in the bank-
1 •• Id. at 282 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
108 Id. at 282-83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
1" Id. at 286 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
1 .. Id. at 290 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
1041 Id. at 291 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
107 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2). 
1" 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(c). Despite repeated efforts by the Service to secure judicial sup-
port for a preferred priority status for trust fund taxes, courts have held fum, employing a 
balancing test between the Bankruptcy Code which favors the rehabilitation of bankrupt 
entities and the Internal Revenue Code which protects and promotes the tax assessment 
and collection system. This tension was discussed extensively by the Eleventh Circuit in 
United States v. A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 823 F.2d 462, (11th Cir. 1987), 
vacated, 486 U.S. 1002 (1988). In A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., the court, quoting 
S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5799-800, 
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rupt's estate is allocated, after payment of secured creditors, to the 
non-trust fund portion of the corporation's tax liability, i.e. the 
corporate income tax. 169 
In determining the amount of the 100% penalty to be assessed in 
connection with employment taxes, any payment made on the cor-
porate account involved is deemed to represent the employer's por-
tion of the liability including assessed penalty and interest unless 
there was some specific designation to the contrary by the 
taxpayer. 180 
In June 1990, the Supreme Court held in United States v. En-
ergy Resources Co. that bankruptcy courts were empowered to de-
termine whether non-designated payments could be applied to 
trust fund taxes if a corporation, functioning under Chapter 11, 
would benefit.161 This decision is confined to reorganization plans, 
not liquidation under Chapter 7. In either instance, the potentially 
responsible person remains "hostage" to unpaid trust funds. 162 
IV. WILLFULNESS-THE SECOND AND INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF 
SECTION 6672 
A. The Evolution of Willfulness 
Section 6672 liability also requires willfulness. The willfulness 
requirement originated in Paddock v. Siemoneit,163 a pre-section 
6672 case. In that case, the Texas Supreme Court held Paddock 
liable for the statutory penalty imposed for non-payment of 
observed: 
A three-way tension thus exists among (1) gener8I creditors, who should not have the 
funds available for payment of debts exhausted by an excessive accumulation of taxes 
for past years; (2) the debtor, whose "fresh start" should likewise not be burdened 
with such an accumulation; and (3) the tax collector, who should not lose taxes which 
he has not had reasonable time to collect or which the law has restrained him from 
collecting. (citation omitted) 
Id. at 464 . 
... Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(4) (1976). 
180 J. Moore & L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy 11 64.401, at 2151 (14th ed. 1975). 
,., 495 U.S. 545 (1990). The remaining non-trust fund tax liabilities fall within the prior-
ity provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 
lI. For a comprehensive discussion of trust fund taxes as preferences, see Falk, Trust 
Fund Taxes in Bankruptcy: Significant Developments in Chapter 7,11, and 13 Cases, Bank. 
Dev. J. Vol. 7, 1990. 
,., 218 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. 1949). 
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taxes.16• Characterizing the penalty as civil, the court ruled that 
willful does not require an evil or fraudulent purpose.166 Rather, a 
person exercising free will or choice who intentionally disregards 
the statute or is indifferent to its requirements will be held person-
ally liable.166 
From Paddock, three propositions evolved which federal appel-
late courts have subsequently used to impose liability on the "re-
sponsible person": 
1. A civil penalty may co-exist with criminal sanctions even 
though the civil penalty is more severe;167 
2. the term "willful", as used in the civil statute, is not synony-
mous with evil motive contained in criminal statutes and does not 
require proof of a specific intent to defeat payment of corporate 
taxes;168 and 
3. the Supreme Court cases of United States v. Murdock 169 and 
Spies v. United States170 support a contextual analysis of willful, a 
term of many meanings. 
For all practical purposes, the Texas Supreme Court's decision 
in Paddock extinguished willfulness as a required element in the 
civil penalty context. The court made no attempt to assess the im-
port of this decision. More importantly, it made no attempt to re-
view the legislative history of the provision or to determine legisla-
tive intent. 
Moran characterizes this decision as an "interpretive leap,"171 
one which clearly ignores or rejects ab initio the more insightful 
analysis of willfulness by the lower court: 
[W]e believe the severity of the civil penalty here involved requires 
that we give the term of that portion of the statute the same strict 
... Id. at 432-33. The court did admit, however, that C. J. Siemoneit was the disbursing 
officer of the corporation who decided whether taxes would be paid when due. The court's 
focus was the corporate officer's conduct with respect to the duty to pay taxes, not his 
conduct in paying other creditors . 
• ea Id. at 434-35 . 
• ea Id . 
• 8. Id. at 435 . 
• ea Id . 
• 88 290 U.S. 389 (1933) . 
.. 0 317 U.S. 492 (1943). 
171 Moran, supra note 24, at 758. 
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construction that we would give the portions of the statute which 
provide for criminal penalties. It is to be noted that the portions of 
the statute providing for criminal penalties contain the same word-
ing concerning willful failure to pay the tax. It is familiar law that 
where the same expression appears several times in a statute it will 
ordinarily be given the same meaning throughout the statute.17lI 
Paddock's interpretation of "willfulness" was expanded in In re 
Haynes. 178 After characterizing willful as a term of many mean-
ings, the district court concluded that willful is not tantamount to 
wicked design "but rather that the person acts knowingly and in-
tentionally."17" This test is reserved for those who, "by reason of a 
bona fide misunderstanding as to ... the liability for the tax, as to 
... the duty to make a return, or as to the adequacy of ... records 
... maintained, should become a criminal by mere failure to mea-
sure up to the prescribed standard of conduct."1711 In the civil con-
text, if the corporate officer controls the tax fund and appropriates 
such funds to some other purpose, he acts willfully.176 
As with Paddock, the Haynes court elected not to review the 
interlocking relationships of the civil and criminal penalties. 
Rather, the court's. pronouncement moved decisively in the oppo-
site direction. The court confirmed that section 6672's predecessor 
was non-penal and was intended to secure the collection of a fund 
"that has passed into the hands of the employer, which is in the 
nature of a trust fund, the employer acting as a collecting agency 
for the United States."177 
The final encounter with section 6672's precursor provision oc-
curred one year later when the District Court of Connecticut de-
cided Kellems v. United States.178 In Kellems, plaintiffs did not 
withhold any pay from the employees' wages, alleging that the In-
come Tax Withholding Act was unconstitutional. l79 The court held 
that "willful," as used in section 2702(a), meant without reasonable 
171 214 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tex. App. 1948). 
178 88 F. Supp. 379 (D. Kan. 1949) . 
... Id. at 385. 
mId. (emphasis added). 
17' Id. 
177 Id. at 384. 
178 97 F. Supp. 681 (D. Conn. 1951) . 
... Id. at 682. 
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cause. ISO Here, Kellems' opposition to the income tax act on politi-
cal grounds did not constitute proper or reasonable cause for non-
compliance.lsl Because plaintiffs "intentionally and deliberately" 
refused to withhold any pay-over income taxes accruing against 
their employees, their conduct was willful.182 
Neither Paddock, In re Haynes or Kellems addressed the nexus 
between the 100% penalty provision and other felony tax statutes. 
By treating the penalty as "civil," the courts never came to terms 
with the effect of its application to corporate officer conduct. The 
cases which follow demonstrate the harsh consequences of the 
court's reluctance to examine this nexus. Willfulness, at least in 
the civil context, became a virtual substitute for strict liability. 
B. The Bloom Imprimatur 
The Ninth Circuit solidified the holdings of the trilogy in Bloom 
v. United States. ISS In adopting carte blanche the prior interpreta-
tion of the trilogy, the court stated: 
The decision of the appellant as the responsible officer of the cor-
poration not to have the corporation pay over to the government 
the withheld taxes was a voluntary, conscious, and intentional act 
to prefer other creditors of the corporation over the United States. 
. . such conduct was willful within the meaning of Section 
2707(a).184 
Bloom contended that proof of criminal intent, motive or pur-
pose to violate the tax law was necessary to establish civil liabil-
ity.ISII This contention, observed the court, was erroneous.1SG To in-
voke sanctions under section 2707(a), there need not be an intent 
to defraud or deprive the United States. Rather, intent is supplied 
by mere payment to other creditors. 
,.. Id. at 686. 
,., Id. at 684-85. 
,.. Id. at 686. 
'88 272 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1959). 
'84 Id. at 223. 
, •• Id. 
, •• Id. 
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C. The Trilogy Standard Enunciated in Monday v. United 
States 
Monday v. United States187 surpassed Bloom and reduced the 
term "willfully" to an independent element of civil liability. In 
Monday, the court contrasted criminal willfulness (bad purpose or 
absence of any justifiable excuse) with civil willfulness (intentional, 
knowing and voluntary acts), noting that "[t]hese concepts tend to 
evoke notions of evil motive or bad purpose which properly play no 
part in the civil definition of willfulness."188 Consequently, the 
court held that a corporate president who had "reasonable cause" 
or "justifiable excuse" for failure to pay over withholding taxes 
could not avoid civil liability.189 Confirming the special status of 
the tax collection process, the court elaborated: 
"[R]easonable cause" and "justifiable excuse" invite consideration 
of such misleading and improper factors as the financial condition 
of the business or the demands of creditors . . . . The defenses 
countenanced by the district court's use of "reasonable cause" and 
"justifiable excuse" are inconsistent with the purposes of Congress 
to protect the sources of revenue by permitting recovery from 
those individuals charged with the responsibility of transferring 
withheld funds to the government.190 
In United States v. Bishop, the United States Supreme Court 
came to grips with the semantic confusion associated with the term 
willful. l91 In Bishop, the taxpayer was convicted of violating sec-
••• 421 F.2d 1210 (7th Cir. 1970). 
'88. Id. at 1216 . 
••• Id at 1216. The prevailing view is that once the test is satisfied, consideration of the 
specific reason for non-payment is not necessary or relevant. Newsome v. United States, 431 
F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1970) (an expectation that 8ufficient funds will become available will not 
exonerate an otherwise responsible person who voluntarily, consciously and intentionally 
prefers non-governmental creditors); Simpson v. United States, 664 F.Supp. 43, 46 
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (conscious payment of creditors other than the government is willful, even 
if expenditures are necessary to stay in business); Teel v. United States, 529 F.2d 903, 906 
(9th Cir. 1976) (mistaken belief by responsible person that tax need not or cannot be paid 
over does not render failure to pay non-willful). 
'00 Id. 
101 412 U.S. 346 (1973). The earlier line of cases included Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 
492 (1943), and United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933). In Spies, the Court held 
that the difference between a felony and a misdemeanor under the Revenue Act of 1936 is 
found in the affirmative conduct implied from the term "attempt" as used in Section 
145(b), the felony section: "[lIt would be unusual that Congress, by the felony defined in 
§ 145(b), meant no more than the same derelictions it had just defined in Section 145(a) as 
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tion 7206(1) which made it a felony when one "[w]illfully makes 
and subscribes any return ... which he does not believe to be true 
and correct as to every material matter."192 Bishop requested a 
lesser:'inc1uded-offense instruction based upon the misdemeanor 
provision of section 7207, contending that willful in the misde-
meanor provision requires less than the same word in the felony 
provision.19s The taxpayer argued that the jury could find the con-
duct a misdemeanor if his conduct was the result of 'caprice or 
careless disregard of duty, not evil purpose.19 .. 
The district court refused the instruction. However, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the judge had improperly refused the instruction 
arid remanded the case for a new trial.1911 The circuit court's ruling, 
by its very nature, was based on a stricter interpretation of willful-
ness in the felony context.1ge Within the meaning of section 
7206(1), the' court held that willfulness required "proof .of an evil 
motive and bad faith."19? Under the misdemeanor category, the 
only proof required was "unreasonable, capricious, or careless dis-
regard for the truth or falsity of income tax returns filed .... "198 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the term willful has 
the same meaning regardless of usage: 
. Although the described states of mind might be included in the 
normal meaning of the word "willfully," the presence of both an 
express designation and simultaneous requirement that a violation 
be committed "willfully" is strong evidence that Congress used the 
word "willfully" to describe a constant rather than a variable in 
the tax penalty formula. l99 
a misdemeanor." Spies, 317 U.S. at 497. Willfulness in the criminal offense includes evil 
motive and want of justification. In Murdock, the Court held that "willfully" denoteS an 
intentional, voluntary or knowing act, as distinguished from accidental. But when "will-
fully" is used in criminal statutes, it means an act done with bad purpose, without justifia-
ble excuse, stubbornly, obstinately, perversely, or conduct marked by careless disregard. 
When determining misdemeanor willfulness, good faith and actual belief should be taken 
into account. Murdock, 290 U.S. at 396. . 
... 412 U.S. at 348, 350 (quoting I.R.C. § 7260(1». 
,.. Id. at 350. 
, .. Id. 
,.. Id. at 348. 
, .. Id. at 351. 
, .. Id. at 354 (quoting United States v. Bishop, 455 F.2d 612, 615 (9th Cir. 1972». 
, •• Id. (quoting United States v. Bishop, 455 F.2d 612, 615 (9th Cir. 1972». 
'H Id. at 359-60. 
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. In reaching its decision, the Cour~ astutely observed that with 
the exception of two subsections, all other tax offenses set forth in 
sections 7201 through 7207 require the acts constituting the of-
fense to be done "willfully."sOO This provided compelling evidence 
that Congress intended a constant rather than a variable standard 
in imposing tax offense penalties: "Until Congress speaks other-
wise, we therefore shall continue to require, in both tax felonies 
and tax misdemeanors that must be done 'willfully,' the bad pur-
pose or evil motive described in Murdock . ... "201 
The Bishop analysis omitted any explicit comparison between 
civil and criminal violations. However, unlike the confused maze of 
case law that preceded it, the Bishop instruction offered a uniform 
definition of "willful," irrespective of context. In civil cases, appel-
late courts have not used this unitary definition, and instead have 
used Monday's strained reading of "willfully." The severity of this 
move may have triggered the Supreme Court's creation of what 
would soon be characterized as a bona fide qualification of willful-
ness in the civil context, personal fault. 
D. Personal Fault-Willfulness Reinforced 
. The Supreme Court relaxed the trilogy's "willful" standard in 
civil cases in Slodov v. United States.S02 Slodov presented two is-
sues for consideration: (1) Whether a person is liable under section 
6672 for the corporation's unpaid taXes withheld from wages prior 
to his control,20s and (2) Since the obligations under section 6672 
are phrased in the conjunctive, whether a person is subject to the 
section only if those duties - to collect, truthfully account for, and 
pay over - are applicable to him with respect to the tax dollars in 
question.20• 
The Court held that a responsible person does not violate sec-
tion 6672 by willfully using funds for purposes other than satisfac-
tion of the tax liability.20Ii The opinion assumed that at the time he 
acquired control there were no funds to satisfy the tax obligation, 
100 Id. at 359. 
101 Id. at 361. 
'01 436 U.S. 238 (1978). 
loa Id. at 240-41. 
... Id. at 246-47. 
10. Id. at 259. 
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and that funds generated after the change in control could not be 
traced to collected taxes.20e Brennan's opinion was clear: 
As noted in the previous section [of the opinion], § 6672 as con-
strued by the Government would, in effect, make the responsible 
person as~uming control of a business a guarantor for payment of 
the delinquent taxes simply by undertaking to continue operation 
of the business. That construction is precluded by the history and 
context of § 6672 and cognate provisions of the Code. 
. . . The fact that the provision imposes a "penalty" and is vio-
lated only by a "willful failure" is itself strong evidence that it was 
not intended to impose liability without personal fault.S07 
In a strict sense, the Supreme Court appears to have addressed 
personal fault as an element of willfulness even though the issue 
before the Court was the meaning of the term "responsible per-
son." As Professor Moran has noted, the Slodov requirement of 
personal fault was likely "fashioned out of the Court's apparent 
belief that the facts failed to reveal the degree of fault necessary to 
impose the very substantial tax penalty sanction."208 Moreover, the 
Court also held that the language of section 6672 does not limit 
liability to people who are required to perform all three duties.209 
By introducing the personal fault requirement, the Court indi-
rectly overruled Bloom. The realization that this may have worked 
a far less punitive standard into the penalty equation may have 
compelled the Court to expand section 6672's. net at the front end. 
The predominate concern-that a person required to perform all 
three duties might easily exculpate himself from liability by termi-
nating his employment prior to the payment date of the withhold-
ing taxes-provided the impetus for the Court's posture. The 
Court made this clear in its discussion of the "pay over" function: 
"Because the duty to pay over the taxes arises only at the quar-
ter's end, a 'responsible person' who willfully failed to collect taxes 
would escape personal liability for that failure simply by resigning 
his position and transferring to another the decisionmaking re-
sponsibility prior to the quarter's end."210 
.... Id. at 259-60 . 
•• , Id. at 253-54. 
.... Moran, supra note 24, at 790 . 
•• 0 Slodov, 436 U.S. at 250 . 
• ,. Id at 247. This pre-occupation of the Supreme Court left an enormous gap yet to be 
addressed by the appellate courts or the Federal Court of Claims - imposing liability on a 
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On close examination, the Court's interpretation of willfulness in 
terms of personal fault may have little practical significance.2ll Al~ 
, though the majority opinion emphasized Slodov's lack of personal 
fault, the decision to exonerate Slodov was based upon the defini-
tion of his legal duties, i.e. that he was not a responsible person 
until the quarter after the Service found his predecessor to be in 
violation of section 6672. At the time he became responsible, there 
were no trust fund taxes available from which to pay the withhold-
ing taxes.212 As a result, Slodov did not even satisfy the traditional 
test for willfulness: payment to creditors other than the govern-
ment with knowledge that the trust fund taxes remained unpaid. 
Two recent cases are illustrative. In Godfrey u. United States,213 
the Federal Circuit reversed the portion of a Claims Court decision . 
finding Godfrey liable.214 The court held that willfulness must be 
viewed in light of the taxpayer's personal fault. 2111 Despite God-
frey's knowledge of past delinquencies, there was no evidence that 
Godfrey knew of the company's failure to pay withholding taxes.216 
Focusing on the deliberate nature of the individual's election not 
to pay the taxes and the circumstances associated with the re-
fusal,217 the court concluded that Godfrey's failure to pay the taxes 
lacked the "personal fault, the epitome of willfulness. "218 
In Heimark u. United States,219 after concluding that plaintiff 
did not meet the status, duty, and authority prongs of the respon-
sible person test, the court stated: 
person, such as a CPA, whose corporate mandate is to truthfully account for the trust fund 
(recording the numbers, preparing the 941's, etc.) but who has no authority to collect or pay 
over the taxes. It is questionable that § 6672 might be construed in this fashion since con-
trollers, accountants and even company attorneys would be unable to conform their conduct 
to the 'law and avoid liability as a "responsible person." This may raise fundamental due 
process considerations. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). 
III See In re Osborn, 4 Bankr. 431, 436 (Bankr. w.n. Mo. 1979) (holding that Osborn's 
conduct not to deposit gross payroll in a separate account per an agreement with the Service 
was willful under the invalidated Bloom test or satisfied the personal fault requirement of 
the Slodov test). 
111 Id. at 251. 
m 748 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
... Id. at 1579 . 
... Id. at 1577. 
II. Id . 
... Id . 
... Id. at 1579. 
Il. 18 Cl. Ct. 15 (1989). 
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[A] willful act under § 6672 is a "deliberate choice voluntarily, 
consciously and intentionally made to pay other creditors instead 
of paying the Government" (Citation omitted) .... 
The primary focus of this test is upon the taxpayer's diligence in 
attending to the duty to pay employment taxes. By undertaking all 
reasonable efforts to fulfill that duty, a taxpayer can show that he 
did not willfully neglect his duty.22o 
Reasonable efforts included attempts by the taxpayer to remind 
the CEO of the deficiency and to suggest strategies to pay the 
taxes despite the corporation's financial demise.221 Relying on God-
frey, the court reaffirmed that section 6672's penalty provision will 
not trigger liability without some type of personal fault. 222 Per-
sonal fault imposes liability where one has the power to disperse 
available funds to the government but fails to do so without com-
pelling reason. The standard does not obviate the need to make a 
careful analysis of the status, duty, and authority elements of "re-
sponsible person". 
E. Flip Side of Willfulness - Reckless Disregard 
In the years following Monday, courts remained faithful to the 
trilogy standard. By the mid-1970's, the courts had firmly en-
trenched the mechanical application of the three-part test into the 
case law, ensuring that trust fund taxes would receive optimum 
protection. The standard's continued vitality was never seriously 
questioned. Beginning in 1981, the courts added a twist: willfulness 
could now be shown if the taxpayer acts in reckless disregard of 
facts which establish an outstanding tax obligation. IllS This addi-
tion greatly increased the government's ability to recover trust 
II. Id. at 24 (quoting White v. United States, 372 F.2d 513, 521 (Cl. Ct. 1967» . 
• 11 Id. II. Id. at 25. In Schultz v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 280, 286 (1990), affd, 918 F.2d 164 
(1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1686 (1991), the Claims Court concluded that the plaintiffs . 
knowledge of the tax delinquency when he signed the third quarter tax return, his execution 
of five checks to creditors during this period, and his sole control over the business indi-
cated that the preference of other creditors was personal fault . 
... This is not a pure· negligence standard. Kalb v. United States, 505 F.2d 506, 511 (2nd 
Cir. 1974); United States v. Leuschner, 336 F.2d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1964). But in Leuschner, 
where a pattern of negligence with multiple, successive corporate enterprises was discern-
able, the court classified Leuschner's actions with respect to the second corporation as a 
reckless disregard for obvious and known risks, constituting a voluntary, conscious and in-
tentional failure to pay. Id. 
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fund taxes. It also obscured the boundaries between "responsible 
person" and '~willfulness." 
1. Relying on the Representations of a Third Person 
First, courts have held that reliance upon the statements of a 
person controlling corporate finances constitutes reckless disregard 
when the circumstances show that the responsible person knew or 
should have known that the person making the statements was not 
reliable. For example, in Gold v. United States,224 Gold, the trea-
surer and part owner, signed returns and handled disbursements, 
bills, and payroll taxes.2211 Subsequently, Gold and others affiliated 
with A & S formed another corporate entity.us Gold became the 
secretary-treasurer and was placed in charge of bookkeeping, coor-
dinating the activities of corporate buildings, and preparing budg-
ets.227 Though he continued to exercise check signing authority, his 
powers over CPS's financial affairs were somewhat less than those 
exercised at A & S.228 
Starting with the first quarter of 1972, CPS began to neglect fil-
ing and paying taxes.229 Gold admitted at trial that by late 1972 he 
knew CPS was delinquent in the payment of taxes.230 He contin-
ued to incur expenses, accept his salary, and voiced no objection 
when other creditors were paid.231 
At trial, Gold was found to be a "responsible person" because of 
his involvement with the corporation's financial operations, includ-
ing the payment of creditors.232 As to willfulness, the court con-
firmed that mere negligence is inadequate to trigger section 6672 
liability.us In this case, however, Gold was aware of. the corpora-
tion's· mismanagement, yet continued to approve payments to 
creditors rather than to the government. He made no attempt to 
••• 506 F. Supp. 473 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), afrd, 671 F.2d 492 (2nd Cir. 1991) . 
••• Id. at 475 . 
••• Id. at 476 . 
... Id . 
... Id . 
••• Id . 
• ao Id. at 477 . 
... Id . 
••• Id. at 478-79 . 
• oa Id. 
HeinOnline -- 13 Va. Tax Rev. 268 1993-1994
268 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 13:225 
investigate whether taxes were being paid.284 Failure by a responsi-
ble person to investigate or to correct mismanagement after being 
put on notice that withholding ta.xes are delinquent constitutes 
willfulness.2811 
2. Payment to Creditors Other Than the Government When the 
Company is Financially Troubled 
Liability also is imposed when a responsible person continues to 
pay other creditors while knowing that a company's financial posi-
tion is precarious. If the taxpayer fails to make a reasonable in-
quiry as to whether money would be available for payment of 
taxes, and should have done so, willfulness is satisfied. This was 
the case in Teel v. United States.286 Plaintiffs in Teel were at the 
time of the delinquency subject to an order of distraint by the 
State of Washington.28? Despite this, plaintiffs used funds received 
from the sale of inventory to pay for new merchandise.s88 The. 
court reasoned: "[A]s the cash went into the cash drawer, it be-
came subject to trust or lien in favor of the federal government for 
the unpaid withholding taxes."289 By using the funds, "they unwit-
tingly supplied the necessary willfulness. "2.~ 
V. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
One commentator recently noted that "[c]ourts overwhelmingly 
... Id . 
• a. See also Turbin v. United States, 970 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that an officer 
serving as a functionary or courier for mine owner in financial management of the operating 
company neither knew of nor recklessly disregarded the operating company's trust fund tax 
deficiency). 
I .. 529 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1976) . 
... Id. at 904 . 
• as Id. at 905 . 
• a. Id . 
... Id. See also Ruth v. United States, 823 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987). The Seventh Circuit 
held that in order to preserve the intended reach of § 6672, willfulness may be established 
by a showing of gross negligence involving a known risk of violations. Relying on Wright v. 
United States, 809 F. 2d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 1987), the court confirmed that a responsible 
person can be liable if she "(1) clearly ought to have known that (2) there was a grave risk 
that withholding taxes were not being paid and if (3) [she] was in a position to find out for 
certain very easily." Id. Ruth knew that the company was encountering tax difficulties, 
checking accounts were overdrawn, and payroll checks were dishonored. Ruth nonetheless 
continued to sign checks to creditors other than the Service. This conduct supported the 
conclusion that Ruth was willful. Id. 
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rely upon democratic institutions to remedy abuses in taxation, 
rather than exercising a strong hand in: judicial review."2H A recur-
rent theme in the application of section 6672 is that courts are 
loathe to encroach upon or to usurp the legislative domain. While 
the courts have attempted to harmonize their results with legisla-
tive intent, they have avoided or side-stepped two of section 6672's 
problematic aspects: (1) section 6672 is a severe statutory sanction 
which is punitive to individuals; and (2) one's willfulness is a sepa-
rate, indispensable element of section 6672 and cannot be conclu-
sively presumed because one is a corporate officer and the corpora-
tion pays creditors other than the government during a tax claim 
delinquency. 
Lack of meaningful examination by the courts of the statutory 
history and of the actual wording of the statute has undermined 
the congressional intent concerning the "willfulness" aspect of the 
provision. A careful reading of these two sources reveals that the 
true target of section 6672 is individuals who have the power to 
direct available funds to the Service for payment of current with-
holding taxes but who choose not to exercise that power. Whether 
the personal fault referred to by the Supreme Court will turn this 
tide remains an open question. Because the Service and courts 
have failed to give sufficient weight to personal fault, there has 
been a renewed emphasis on legislative reform to interject equity 
and to protect the unwary, ministerial employee from the adverse 
consequences of section 6672's pervasive reach. One minor step in 
the direction of fairness is the pending bill, Taxpayer Bill of Rights 
11.242 This bill would modify the penalties for responsible person 
by exonerating employees who on their own initiative bring their 
employer's failure to pay to the attention of the Service. The 
House of Representatives' version, the Tax Fairness and Economic 
Growth Bill of 1992,243 explains the reason for the proposed 
change: "Individuals have been held liable for this penalty even 
after they have brought their employers' failure to pay to the at-
tention of the IRS." The proposed modification would extricate 
from liability a responsible person who satisfies the Service within 
... Gale A. Norton, The Limitless Federal Taxing Power, 8 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 591 
(1985) . 
... S. 2239, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1992) . 
... H.R. 4210, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). 
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ten days of the failure to pay over trust fund taxes to the govern-
ment, so long as satisfaction is made prior to the due date for 
taxes.244 
Other reform measures should focus on the need to segregate 
funds. Corporate and tax revenues should not be commingled be-
cause they will be a tempting source of cash when business sours. 
Imposing a duty to segregate tax funds when payroll is processed 
would assure that money is available to pay over to the govern-
ment. This step would fulfill the congressional mandate of collect-
ing trust fund taxes without creating a burdensome administrative 
bureaucracy. 
Section 6672 will continue to impose harsh penalties. These pen-
alties are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Thus, many of the pen-
alties - staggering in amount2411 and bearing no relationship to the 
amount of the salary earned by the "responsible person" - will 
remain on the rolls of the Service, uncollected and uncollectible 
because the costs and anxieties to innocent people who are beset 
by section 6672 can easily lead to their personal insolvency. Hence, 
either the Service,246 the judiciary or the Congress must return to 
the historic meaning of section 6672 if crippling and unwarranted 
penalties are to be avoided . 
••• H.R. 4210 died in legislative session . 
••• It may be prudent - particularly in light of Austin v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2801 
(1993), where the United States Supreme Court held that civil in rem forfeiture operates as 
punishment and is therefore subject to limitations imposed by the Eighth Amendment's 
Excessive Fines Clause - for courts to examine the impact of the destructively high penalties 
in section 6672 cases . 
••• The Service could perhaps achieve such an objective either through rulemaking or 
through greater circumspection in pursuing "the usual suspects." 
